Donald Trump has recently called European leaders"weak." Peace talks organized by the United States are making no headway, American foreign policy is turning sharply inward, and Europe is beginning to feel that it no longer has anyone to delegate its security to.

Slovakia is entering this with the government of Robert Fico, which openly adopts some of the Russian narratives and weakens the common European line. In the Czech Republic, the government is headed by Andrej Babiš, a politician who, according to experts, can adapt very quickly to any direction of power.

" Putin is not concerned with any territory. He is waging a war against the very existence of Ukraine as a state," says Czech Ukraine scholar David Svoboda , an expert on the modern history of Ukraine and Russian-Ukrainian relations, and a long-time employee of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes in Prague.

According to Svoboda, today it is not a question of who will control which village on the front, but of a complete transformation of the world order." A conflict with Russia awaits us. The question is not if, but when," he adds.

In an interview with Aktuality.sk, he explains why Trump is getting closer to Putin, why Ukraine's territorial concessions would not lead to peace, and why the stance of leaders like Fico or Babiš can weaken the European Union itself.

In the interview you will read:

• Why Trump's strategy actually weakens NATO and strengthens Russia,
• Why, according to Svoboda, a conflict with Russia is"only a matter of time",
• Why Ukraine's territorial concessions mean the path to its demise,
• How Fico and Babiš fit into the new geopolitics - and why it could be a risk for Europe,
• What awaits Ukraine in the coming year and why European air defense will be decisive.

Let's start with President Zelensky's meeting with European leaders on Monday. We didn't learn much from it, but what can we expect from it? What will these and other meetings be about?

I would say that this was a kind of balancing and calming step. Europe is interested in making its position known and demonstrating unwavering support for Ukraine, in the face of the initiatives of the American president, which not only disregard Ukraine's vital interests, but in recent days have confirmed the fears of people who saw in the Trump administration an ideologically motivated actor hostile to deeper European values. For me, it is déjà vu, a return to the days of February.

What do you see as the similarity?

I say this with reference to JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference. What was said there now appears explicitly again in the new American strategy. The whole framework of these events only appears to be an effort to find peace. In reality, it is more of a futile diplomatic dance that neither side takes seriously. And if anyone does take it seriously at all, it is the American administration. However, it is not about a just peace, but about a quick peace to arms so that Donald Trump can present it as his next diplomatic success.

Trump said on Tuesday that European leaders are weak. Is he right?

To some extent, yes, but the answer has several levels.

First of all, yes, they are weak.

Second, it is remarkable that this is being said by Donald Trump, who is not using the power of the United States for a good cause, but rather for some vulgar deal, hastily put together with Vladimir Putin.

And third, European leaders are weak also because the term “European” denotes a very loose entity that is not used to a unified foreign policy. But history is now pressing it to this need.

Finding rapid and effective unity at a time when we must prepare for the real threat of a Russian attack is extremely challenging. If Europe could do it, it would be another of the marvels of Western civilization.

Is there anyone in Europe today who can be described as a strong leader?

I would evaluate it individually and always in the context of how strong and culturally predisposed the society of the leader is. Germany has undergone a significant shift in recent months, which adapts it to the spirit of the times much more than, for example, the Czech Republic. It can be said that European leaders today are undergoing a kind of casting for stronger figures.

Traditionally strong are Germany, Britain and France. Smaller countries can surprise, sometimes positively, but their ability to influence the direction of Europe is naturally limited by the size of their economy or defense industry.

Can we say that no American leader in recent years has been as close to Putin as Donald Trump? This is also shown by the people Trump chooses as envoys to Russia, for example Steve Witkoff, who is connected to Russian business. Who are these people and what does this all indicate? Is it some kind of economic deal?

The question of who these people are is directly related to the question of who Donald Trump is. And we are again faced with whether we are dealing with an individual who has eccentrically turned the helm of American foreign policy, or rather with someone who personifies a longer-term change of trend, fatigue, and a certain emptying of American foreign policy identity.

We can talk about this at great length. If I start with the simplest conspiracy theory, someone will say that Trump is a Russian agent. For example, journalist Alexandra Alvarova says that he is not an agent, but an asset. That is, someone who is useful to an enemy power, although he may not even realize it, because he was cultivated, prepared by that power for a long time and is in a certain way obligated to it.

On a personal level, Trump's limited worldview and values play a big role. He is very focused on quick profit and believes that the world can be run according to a few simple rules, closer to the world of business than diplomacy. For him, politics is a"deal". He thinks that there is no one in the world with whom an agreement cannot be made.

In addition to these business attributes, he also has his own worldview, which favors the strong over the weak. According to him, the weak mean nothing. The strong are everything. And according to this logic, three superpowers – China, Russia and America – can simply divide the world, each ruling its own sphere.

This is very much in line with the ideas that Vladimir Putin has long been formulating. According to them, the world is multipolar, there are no rules, and it's just a matter of the great powers agreeing on who has their zone where.

By the way, if we want to compare, Trump can in some ways follow the ideas of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. After the war, he also thought about a world where"four policemen" should rule - the USA, Britain, the Soviet Union and China. However, it was a concept guided by a certain naivety, not cynicism. Roosevelt was loyal to American interests, but at the same time he had certain ideals. Trump has nothing like that.

The difference is also that Roosevelt succumbed to the personal charm of Stalin and the Soviet idea of a universal project. Trump has no illusions about Putin. He is attracted only by the radiance of strength, roughness and ruthlessness.

Trump's thinking is so much closer to the far right. I don't want to call him a fascist, but the parallels are visible.

And what about the people around him, like Witkoff?

Trump has a very simple view of loyalty. He has no deeper criteria or sense of diplomatic skills. That is why, for example, Steve Witkoff – a real estate magnate with whom Trump plays golf, rather than a diplomat with relevant qualifications – is put at the center of the action.

Similarly, (Trump's son-in-law) Jared Kushner. He is sometimes credited with the so-called Abraham Accords, which temporarily settled the situation in the Middle East (the 2020 agreements settled diplomatic relations between Israel and Arab countries, ed.). Kushner was also involved in Trump's first campaign in 2016 and partly in the settlement of relations in Gaza. This also led some to believe that Trump was serious about peace. However, today we see that this was a mistake.

Then there are other players. For example, (US Secretary of State) Marco Rubio, who used to be a harsh critic of Russia, is now surprisingly changing his position. It seems that he is calculating his future position in the Republican Party and wants to compete with JD Vance.

If Rubio also leans towards hawkish rhetoric, it says a lot about the atmosphere that prevails in American foreign policy today: isolationism, supplemented as necessary with a certain kind of imperial thinking.

Almost all of these people have distanced themselves from the traditional American school of foreign policy, which understood the compatibility of power and moral principles. Today, they cynically reject it.

In his new strategy, Trump also talks about a shift away from Europe. He also mentions that the European Union should take over NATO leadership by 2027. How should we read that? And isn't it symbolic that Russia also appreciated his speech?

That's exactly right. Trump's strategy is aimed at gradually distancing the United States from Europe. And this is not just some wish of Donald Trump, but a clearly formulated line that his administration is following.

In the context of what you mentioned – that Russia also appreciated this – we return to the same problem: a world divided into spheres of influence. Trump imagines the international environment as a space where the great powers agree on who owns what. And Europe, according to him, is no longer a priority interest of the United States.

Speaking of spheres of influence, isn't it possible that Trump wants to join forces with Russia against China? After all, the US is China's biggest rival. Could this be his tactic?

This was once a popular notion, and in the early months of Trump's first term, many tried to explain his behavior and over-friendly attitude toward Putin.

But there is one fundamental problem with this: it is a completely false assumption.

Russia has nothing of substance to offer America, and America has nothing of substance to offer Russia. They can come closer together in economic interests, yes. And yes, the conflict in Ukraine is an obstacle that Trump would like to cynically and quickly remove. But ideological interests are much more important today for both Moscow and Beijing.

Moscow and Beijing are getting closer by law, not by chance. Russia knows that without China it will not achieve its goals in Europe. And Putin knows that he would not be able to wage his war for five years without China's support. Why would he suddenly break it off?

So what could the US offer Russia?

Very little. Yes, America can stop supporting Ukraine and can cut it off from intelligence. That is all true. But Russia needs something else. It needs a counterweight to China, not another trade “deal.”

And America cannot relax sanctions without looking like an open capitulation to Moscow. Trump simply wouldn't stand for that in a situation where the US elections are approaching and the Republican Party is torn apart.

Russia can do some joint business with the US in the Arctic or polar regions, but that is not enough. In a real military conflict with China, it would not make sense for the US to rely on Russia. And Putin knows very well that he has no long-term future without China.

This American strategy, and especially the shift away from Europe, is causing concern. There are speculations in Europe that this coming summer could be the last"without war". Poland is preparing for a possible conflict with Russia, as are the Nordic countries. Is it just panic or a real threat?

I don't know if this will be the last summer without war. But I am convinced that a conflict with Russia awaits us.

I am not a prophet, but I can make inferences from long-term signals, trends, and motivations of individual actors.

Putin wants to overturn the world order. He's 73, but he's going to be around for a long time. Bad people live long. They don't have a conscience. Psychopaths live to a ripe old age, that's just a fact.

But at the same time, he won’t live forever. And he has reason to hurry. Trump has offered him a huge window of opportunity. Russia is no longer looking disoriented, as it did a few years ago. And Putin has an incentive to hit Europe before it becomes too strong and too united.

America is doing what it's doing. This is another chance for Putin.

Nervousness is growing in Europe. Every day new incidents are coming – balloons from Belarus over Lithuania, Romania reports airspace violations, there is talk of provocations. Czech President Petr Pavel said that if Russia crosses certain boundaries, it is necessary to shoot. The Russians replied that then they would “turn the missiles on Prague”. Isn’t Petr Pavel right about this? Shouldn’t we be more forceful?

The problem is elsewhere. I respect Peter and Paul, but I envy people who can say something completely banal and earn applause as if it were a courageous dissent.

What he said is true. And it should be formulated even more precisely: we should determine the threat scale. And when Russia gets to orange, the next incident will be red, and we will shoot. That is a completely normal logic of deterrence.

But much more importantly, Europe should start protecting Ukrainian airspace.

At least its western part, from Kiev towards the west. Because what is happening in Lviv or Ivano-Frankivsk is not just a Ukrainian problem. It is a threat to Poland, Slovakia, Romania.

Poland has not acted yet because it fears the reaction of its NATO allies. And no one wants to act alone. But if Europe were to make a collective decision to protect Ukrainian skies, it would relieve Ukraine and allow it to shift capabilities to the front and strengthen its chances of survival.

And now the important thing is that most of the attacks on western Ukraine are drones. They are not people. Shooting down drones is not escalation. It is defense.

But the word"escalation" has long been a compromising word for Moscow and a tool of pressure. Europe is still jumping on it.

Today, it is said that Russia did not wage war for territory, but for the total weakening of Ukraine. Is that true?

Yes. Russia is no longer waging a war for territory. The war has moved into a phase of total weakening of the Ukrainian hinterland. It is a war of attrition.

Russia wants to exhaust Ukraine, destroy its energy and infrastructure, disrupt its economy and demoralize the population. That is why it is so important today that Europe takes a greater part in protecting Ukrainian airspace. And that is exactly what Petr Pavel did not say – although that is what Ukraine needs most today.

In recent weeks, corruption scandals have been dealt with in Kiev. Doesn't this play into the hands of people like Fico or Orbán? And could it harm Zelensky himself?

The truth must be told: we don't have another Ukraine. We have the one as it is.

Yes, it is a country with a deep corruption problem, but at the same time it already has very advanced mechanisms that can actually investigate and expose it. And that is extremely important.

This was most recently seen in the raid on Andriy Yermak's house (former head of President Zelensky's office, ed.). That raid showed that Ukrainian institutions are strong and will not be intimidated by influential people. Zelensky is really fighting corruption, and the head of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) has shown that there are no"sacred boundaries" in the fight against it.

However, this has shaken the power vertical on which Zelensky has relied until now. The presidential administration is changing today, and the question is whether we are not at the beginning of the end of this vertical.

What is the biggest systemic problem? Zelensky? Or something else?

Zelensky is not the main problem. The real problem is that the parliament has ceased to fulfill its constitutional role. The Servant of the Nation party has too large a majority, and power concentrated in one hand always, sooner or later, leads to a crisis.

What Ukraine needs most today is a government of national unity.

But elections cannot realistically be held now. So, for now, Ukrainian democracy is being kept afloat by civil society and the military itself.

Many people simplify this and say that Ukraine should “give up territory” to have peace. Why is it so important for Ukraine to keep all its territory?

The key thing is to understand that Putin is not after any specific territory. Territorial demands are just a tool, part of a sausage tactic, similar to the one Hitler used in Czechoslovakia. It started with the Sudetenland, but it didn't end there. And exactly the same thing would happen in the case of Ukraine.

Putin is waging war against the very existence of the Ukrainian state. He does not want Ukraine to survive as a sovereign country. His goal is to transform it into a Russian province, something like today's Belarus - formally existing, but in reality completely subordinate to Moscow and devoid of its own political will.

And it is necessary to say an even more fundamental thing: even if the entity on paper bore the name “Ukraine”, this does not mean that Ukrainians would live in it. And if they did, it may not be the same people. In the occupied territories, a policy of deportations, repressions, forced passportization and ethnic cleansing is already underway. Putin’s intention is simple, namely to empty the very concept of “Ukrainian”, to turn it into a meaningless folklore category, not a full-fledged national identity.

If Ukraine were to cede part of its territory, Russia would gain its fortifications, infrastructure, and human resources, while also opening the door to destabilizing Ukrainian politics from within. This is a direct recipe for civil war and the gradual disintegration of the entire state.

Therefore, Ukraine has nothing to give up. Territorial concessions would not bring peace, but on the contrary, would hasten its demise and only push the front further west.

Speaking of Putin's goals, what would a victory in Ukraine mean for politicians like Robert Fico or Viktor Orbán? Would it change their position in Europe?

This is a very hypothetical question because this war will apparently be a generational war and will not end that quickly.

But purely hypothetically, it depends a lot on what the victory itself would look like. We often ask what would await Ukraine after the war, but we think less about what would await Europe after the war. And that could look completely different depending on whether the conflict ends in a limited way or spreads.

If Ukraine had really won in a way that would have fundamentally weakened Russia, Fico and Orbán would have found themselves in a completely different situation. Both the European Union and NATO would be undergoing a profound transformation, and it would be very clear who stood on which side during the war.

Leaders who openly sabotaged common European procedures during times of aggression would have to reckon with the consequences. In extreme cases, if their actions directly aided the aggressor, they could even face political or legal responsibility. Of course, this depends on how the conflict develops.

Hungary could even try to assert its own revisionist interests in the chaos after the war, for example in the Transcarpathian region. Slovakia does not have such space, but its political leaders would lose credibility.

Simply put: a Ukrainian victory would not only mean Putin's defeat, but also a rewriting of power realities in Europe. And Fico and Orbán would not look good in those new realities.

How do Ukrainians view Slovakia and the Czech Republic today? Is there any historical burden in this?

Slovakia is mentioned only marginally in Ukrainian political discourse. And if it is mentioned, it is as an example of a country that has succumbed to populism and whose stance helps Russia advance its interests in Europe. There is no deep emotion in this, more of a statement.

Old historical layers exist – Transcarpathia, the Ruthenian question, the first Czechoslovak Republic, but these are more topics for academics, not for today's politics. They do not play a significant role in the practical perception of Ukraine.

The Czech Republic is different. Ukrainians see Czech engagement and support very well. They distinguish between Czech and Slovak politics, and the contrast is very clear to them.

And as for Fico, he is perceived in Ukraine in a clearly negative way. Not because of Slovakia, but because of himself. His statements are cited as a textbook example of pro-Russian narratives in the European Union.

Czech President Pavel appointed Andrej Babiš as Prime Minister on Monday. Do you think it's fair to label Babiš as a pro-Russian politician? Some foreign media outlets, including Ukrainian ones, have portrayed him that way after his election victory.

That question is more complicated. Babiš is not pro-Russian in the ideological sense that Orbán is. He is the type of politician who can be whatever suits him at the moment. And that is precisely the problem.

He is similar to Yanukovych in this. He was not pro-Russian out of conviction, but because it suited his power. And Babiš works in a similar way. If he sees that the West is weakening and Russia is gaining ground, he will calmly turn in that direction. If not, then no. It is pragmatism without values.

However, there are moments that seem disturbing. For example, the fact that his son found himself in Crimea during the Russian occupation - and he himself claimed that he was taken there against his will. This is a circumstance that the Czech investigation has not yet properly opened. In the life of a politician of this type, these are risky signals.

So no, Babiš is not clearly pro-Russian.

But yes, he can become one at any time if it suits him.

What do you think awaits Ukraine in the coming year? We see that the front is moving minimally, Russia is increasing pressure and Trump in the USA is changing the entire foreign policy. What developments are realistic?

The most realistic scenario is very simple: Ukraine is going to have an extremely difficult year. I don't think it will be able to make any significant territorial gains. At this stage of the war, it is no longer about the rapid movement of the front, but about the long-term ability to survive, function and resist. In addition, another problem is emerging, namely that America will gradually withdraw from its dominant role as a supporter of Ukraine.

If we add to this what we see from Russia today, we get a very unpleasant picture. Moscow is no longer waging war as a fight for specific lines on the map. It is a war of attrition, aimed at the total weakening of the state from within: the destruction of energy, the paralysis of infrastructure, the depletion of the population.

Ukraine will thus struggle not only for territory, but for the very functionality of its state.

In this situation, it will be absolutely crucial whether Europe can stand on its own two feet and take on some of the burden that the United States has so far carried. Without European air defense and without European ammunition, Ukraine's problems will increase significantly.

All of this doesn't mean that Ukraine will lose. It just means that survival will be much more difficult than it has been so far.

Do you feel that Trump and his team understand what is happening in Europe? Or is it more of ideological blindness or calculation?

First of all, it is ideological blindness. To Trump and some of his entourage, the world appears to be a space where great powers struggle with each other, and small states are secondary. He sees no difference between the Czech Republic, Ukraine, or Belgium. For him, they are unilaterally dependent units that are supposed to join some great power and respect its rules.

Trump simply does not understand a world where there are middle-sized states that stand on values and cooperate. He does not understand a multilateral world. He does not understand that it is the weaker and middle-sized actors who are the pillars of stability. His thinking is a world of business deals, not geopolitics.

Added to this is his fascination with authoritarians. Not because he admires them ideologically, but because he is impressed by their style, namely their power, ruthlessness, and ability to act without control. That is why Putin is not repulsive to him, but rather sympathetic. He is a “strong man” to him. And that is how he acts.