A few days ago, Israel made the decision to launch an attack in Qatar against Hamas's political leadership. So far, we know that several people were killed and others injured, but it is unknown whether any senior members of the organization's political bureau were among them. Hamas denies that the attack achieved its objective, while Israel has been slow to release the results of its investigations. What is clear is that the operation, carried out just a few kilometers from Washington's most important military base in the region, has not only generated international condemnation and outrage in the emirate—as well as in other countries in the region—but also heightened levels of tension between the United States and Israel that we had not seen during the Trump administration. According to reports, Trump himself learned of the attack when it was already impossible to stop it. What was Netanyahu seeking with this measure? What repercussions could it have? What strategic assessment can be made? Some notes on the matter.
1. It is important to remember that Hamas is made up of different branches. Until the current war, both its military wing and a local political-administrative wing, responsible for governing functions in the Strip, operated in Gaza. Added to this is the Political Bureau, the organization's highest leadership, which was based in Syria until the civil war there pitted it against President Assad. Since 2012, Qatar has offered refuge to this Political Bureau, which has operated from that emirate ever since.
2. The second thing worth understanding—and one we have explained in this space for years—is that Qatar not only possesses enormous wealth and an abundance of resources, but also a very high regional and global geopolitical projection. It is a longtime strategic ally of the United States, and its territory houses a military base of enormous importance to Washington. A look at a map is enough to understand why: the transit of almost a quarter of the world's oil is monitored from there. It was also from that base that, for example, the latest bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities was launched. Furthermore, Qatar is a crucial supplier of oil and gas, particularly at a time when sanctions against Russia have made US allies even more dependent on that energy source. It is no coincidence, therefore, that a few years ago the emirate received the designation of Major Non-NATO Ally from Washington, the highest possible designation for a country that is not part of the Atlantic alliance.
3. Notwithstanding the above, and very aware of its power—both hard and soft—Qatar decided years ago to compete with other countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, to gain influence throughout the region. Taking advantage of the rise of Islamist movements after the Arab Spring, it invested in them, from Tunisia and Egypt to Syria, and precisely offered refuge to Hamas—an organization with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood—as part of that strategy. Although this put it at odds with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and even Washington, Qatar knew that its strategic value gave it room to maneuver in that way and much more. A clear example: Qatar maintains close relations with Russia, China, and Iran, among other US adversaries.
4. In parallel, and seeking to replace Iran, Qatar became one of Hamas's main sources of funding in Gaza during those same years. It should be emphasized that this did not happen behind Netanyahu's back. From the prime minister's perspective, the resources flowing into Hamas allowed it to govern and, to a certain extent, remain within a relatively moderate sphere, in addition to keeping the Palestinian factions divided. This issue has given rise to an ongoing investigation in Israel (known as Qatargate), which for now is targeting some of Netanyahu's closest allies. We will have to wait for the results, but everything indicates that this is one of the internal factors motivating the bombing, as I explain below.
5. That said, until now Israel had not attacked the Hamas leadership in Qatar. Even when it assassinated the group's then-leader, Ismail Haniyeh, it did so during a trip to Iran for the presidential inauguration there, taking advantage of the fact that he was not in Doha. The underlying reason was twofold: on the one hand, Washington's opposition to such an attack being carried out in an allied country; on the other, the risk of fracturing relations with the moderate Arab countries with which Jerusalem maintains good relations. Added to this is the fact that, since the beginning of the war, Qatar has become one of the two main mediators, achieving two ceasefires and the release of hundreds of hostages so far.
6. Over time, however, things changed for Netanyahu. To understand why he crossed this red line, one must look at both internal and external factors.
a. Domestically, as we have pointed out in this space, the prime minister faces the risk of losing his governing coalition if he softens his positions or if he agrees to a ceasefire that he cannot present as a"total victory," in the terms he himself has defined. This has led him to intensify the operation in Gaza, even against the opinion of the military leadership, which opposed the massive invasion of the city and—as far as we know—also the bombing in Qatar. Under pressure from the most extreme parties, Netanyahu fears the collapse of his government and early elections with uncertain outcomes, all while facing three corruption trials. Added to this is the so-called Qatargate scandal: in this context, the attack on the emirate also serves to distance himself from Doha and reinforce, at least politically, his defense against that case.
b. Internationally, Israel seeks to project not only its intelligence capabilities but also its determination to use force against its enemies, no matter where they are, even if this causes tensions with Washington and its allies. Ultimately, this is about restoring the deterrence equation that was deeply damaged in 2023, when Israeli intelligence failed to anticipate the October 7 attacks and security forces were unable to protect its borders and population.
c. While Israel has been restoring deterrence for nearly two years, it is important to note that, despite its many successes in the region, its total victory over Hamas has not yet been achieved. While Hezbollah could only hold out for a few weeks, and Iran for only twelve days, Hamas has been resisting for 23 months, refusing to budge from Netanyahu's demands for total surrender. Based on this logic alone, attacking the group's leadership, even if it is holed up in a US-allied country, makes sense, as it represents an escalation that the prime minister deems necessary.
7. Having said all of the above, Netanyahu may have made several miscalculations here.
a. First, because we do not know whether the attack was effective in eliminating the Hamas leadership, and from what we know so far, there are doubts about this.
b. Second, because this attack strained Netanyahu-Trump relations to the point of drawing serious criticism from the latter (“This does not advance the interests of Israel or anyone else,” he said) and to the point of assuring Qatar that the emirate will not be attacked again, which decreases the likelihood of a new Israeli attack had the Hamas leadership survived.
c. Third, because the ceasefire negotiations are collapsing with no immediate future in sight, at a very complicated moment in the war. If the Hamas leadership has indeed died, communication with that group has been severed, and it has likely hardened the position of the military commandos operating in Gaza, not to mention that any negotiation with those commandos seems impossible under the war conditions prevailing in the Strip. And if the leadership survived, its negotiating position will now be even tougher. Therefore, the only alternative left for Netanyahu is to prolong the war until"total victory," something his own military considers unviable in a context of urban and underground guerrilla warfare. This does not mean that Israel cannot conquer Gaza City or the entire Strip if it so chooses. But it does mean that this will hardly end Hamas's guerrilla resistance and, of course, will endanger the few hostages still alive.
d. Finally, this bombing generates global accusations against Israel for violating international law and leaves it even more isolated diplomatically. But above all, it clashes head-on with Trump's promises, despite the fact that Israel is acting in a very similar way to the United States when it fights an organization that Washington also classifies as terrorist. The point is that Trump had promised to free the hostages, negotiate"peace," and expand the Abraham Accords. What's relevant here is not only that everything points to the opposite happening, but also that it leaves the American president in a very bad light in his effort to project himself as a leader who delivers—something that, ultimately, is central to his political persona.
We'll follow up on all of the above and comment on it here.
