The two back-to-back summits that U.S. President Donald Trump hosted over the past week, first with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska and then with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other European leaders in Washington, D.C., may not have delivered an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine. But the summits did inspire reflection on Chinese social media and elsewhere about China’s perception of the war and its possible role in the peace process.
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Chinese netizens have voiced a range of opinions on the conflict. Many WeChat users criticized the “bullying” and “shameful” reception given to Zelenskyy during his summit with Trump earlier this year. Some online essays about the war have been censored, and some Chinese media outlets have issued censorship directives designed to “keep Weibo posts on Ukraine favorable to Russia.” In this environment, the most visible content tends to skew pro-Russia and anti-Ukraine. This week, WeChat blogger Shu Sheng (舒生) expressed disappointment at the poor quality of online discussion about the war in Ukraine , and enumerated some of the blind spots of “keyboard warriors” who ridicule Ukraine’s spirited defense of its sovereignty:
It is useless to try to reason with these types of netizens. Those who band together online to ridicule Ukraine’s self-defense exemplify anti-intellectualism. They let ideology dictate right and wrong, replace comprehensive analysis with cherry-picked quotes, and allow their personal prejudices to override truth and justice. They lack basic literacy and are often unwilling or unable to comprehend the facts, relying instead on selective snippets to form their conclusions. At times they deliberately feign ignorance, cynically sowing confusion and muddying the waters in order to mislead the public and warp popular opinion.
This rampant and deceptive anti-intellectualism is a toxic virus that infects our political sphere. If allowed to continue proliferating online, it will inevitably erode the public’s intelligence and harm our nation’s progress.
Such collective ridicule only serves to diminish the image of Chinese people in the eyes of the world. [ Chinese ]
In reaction to the summits this week, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning said that “China is willing, in accordance with the will of the parties concerned, to work with the international community to continue playing a constructive role in the political settlement of the crisis.” But as Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy and a Professor in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University, recently argued in Foreign Affairs, the “constructive role” ostensibly sought by the Chinese government is limited by its ambivalence about the war :
Beijing is unlikely to play a leading role in resolving the conflict and achieving a lasting peace in the region. There is no consensus among either Chinese scholars or the general public on how to understand the war—and therefore on how to respond.
[…] Forty months into the war in Ukraine, members of China’s strategic community, including foreign policy and security officials, researchers, and pundits, still have differing views on who is at fault and how leaders in Beijing should respond. Chinese social media platforms have been ablaze with fierce debates between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian voices.
[…] China’s ambiguous stance on the war in Ukraine over the past three years reflects this internal division in Beijing. This isn’t just about disagreements from different camps of opinion; instead, most policymakers recognize both perspectives and do not want to fully embrace one at the expense of the other. The 12-point position paper on Ukraine issued by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2023 embodies this tension. The paper’s first principle emphasizes “respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” a statement that supports Ukraine’s defense of its territory. China has also never recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea nor its claims over four eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. The paper’s second principle, however, which states that the “legitimate security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously,” is a veiled show of support for Russia’s fears regarding Western pressure, including NATO expansion into what Moscow considers its backyard. [ Source ]
Chinese state media has tried to distance China from the war. In an editorial this week titled “Reading China into US-Russia relations a symptom of retrogressive zero-sum mentality,” the Global Times asked, “What does China have to do directly with the just-concluded Alaska meeting between the US and Russian leaders?” In a press conference on Wednesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov floated the idea of China being one of Ukraine’s post-war security guarantors. Chinese analysts expressed skepticism about the proposal. Moreover, Zelenskyy pushed back against the idea, while chiding China: “We don’t need guarantors who don’t help Ukraine, and [who] didn’t help Ukraine at the moment when we really needed it.”
Zelenskyy’s comments reflect the negative arc of Ukraine-China relations since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. There was some optimism last July when Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Guangzhou to enlist China in playing a greater role to bring about peace. But over that summer, China shunned a Swiss peace summit in support of Russia, which widened the gap between Zelenskyy and China.
China’s material and rhetorical support for Russia has played a major role in this estrangement. At the start of this year, Chinese and Russian leaders celebrated moving forward “hand in hand” and vowed to put up a “double resistance” to pressure from the U.S.-led West. The Ukrainian government said that over 150 Chinese mercenaries have joined Russian forces to fight on the battlefield against Ukraine. And numerous articles have described how Chinese companies have assisted Russia by providing “dual use” military equipment, producing attack drones, and exporting precision parts used in Russian weapons. This week, the Kyiv Independent reported that while China has cut off exports of its drones to Ukraine, Ukraine is working on decoupling from Chinese supply chains in its drone industry and boosting domestic production, although many Ukrainian arms makers remain reliant on components made in China.
European views about China’s true intentions toward the war and the peace process have begun to crystalize. At a major E.U-China summit last month, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told Xi Jinping that E.U.-China relations have reached an “inflection point,” in large part due to China’s perceived support of Russia. On Wednesday, Pierre Andrieu at the Asia Society published a report on China-Russia relations since the start of the war, concluding, “This Sino-Russian alignment has deepened significantly since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Beijing continues to back Moscow’s war effort and see Russia as an indispensable strategic partner. In this context, China has no interest in either a total Russian defeat or a decisive Russian victory in Ukraine. […T]he prolongation of the war serves China’s strategic interests.” On Thursday, Nataliya Butyrska wrote for the China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) consortium that China’s dual approach to peace negotiations is a form of “performative neutrality” :
China’s practical actions reveal a substantial gap between its peace-oriented rhetoric and its behavior. Beijing has opposed reducing imports of Russian oil, a step that could have contributed to de-escalation, and continues to provide Moscow with economic and technological support. On August 16, Ukraine imposed sanctions on 39 individuals and 55 companies, including 10 Chinese firms, for supplying components for Russian Shahed drones – ranging from engines and cameras to microchips and resonators. Systemic violations of sanctions by Chinese companies, as well as the recruitment of Chinese citizens by Russia for military service, have persisted despite repeated Ukrainian requests, with no effective response from Beijing.
This dual approach reflects a calculated strategic calculus. The “Friends of Peace” group proposed by China at the United Nations, along with its peace initiatives, serve to position Beijing as a peace broker and enhance its influence among Global South countries. Meanwhile, by refraining from constructive measures capable of ending the war, China ensures the survival of Russia as a geopolitical partner, undermines confidence in US leadership, and safeguards its own economic interests. Should a settlement between Ukraine and Russia be reached, Beijing can highlight its consistent approach as a contributing factor to peace; should the conflict continue, it can blame the West for failing to halt the war – particularly given China’s repeated accusations that Western arms supplies to Ukraine have “added fuel to the fire.” [ Source ]
