At the outset, it should be said that nothing unplanned or unforeseen happened. We predicted from our couches on July 12 that the Russians would try to bypass Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad from the north.
That the situation was not good was visible not only on the map. Ukrainian military analysts and military personnel spoke about it publicly and privately.
What happened?
In mid-May 2025, the Russians managed to cross the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka road and the interaction between these defense areas began to stall.
Then the Russians had two options:
- Turn northwest and bypass Pokrovsk - Myrnohrad.
- Turn northeast and bypass Kostiantynivka.
As is their custom, they tried both options, the first one turned out better. Then on July 12-13, they crossed the Kozeny Torets River, and now we have what we have.
Why did it happen? The reasons are the same, systemic, as in 2024.
On the Ukrainian side, there is a lack of resources (weapons, ammunition), reserves, and poor interoperability. The corps reform and the Kontrakt 18-24 program have been going on for a long time, but they have not solved these systemic problems.
Just as there were gaps between the brigades, through which small groups of Russian infantry pass, so they are. In places there are defensive positions (beautiful, concreted), but no one is defending them. The Russians simply bypass them in small groups, pass deep, and then take those positions.
Counterattacks are not always measured, without assessing whether the available capabilities can carry out these tasks. And who can. For example, units of the 425th assault regiment ran like"fire brigades" between the Sumy and Pokrovsk sectors, and they are still running.
Attacks on Russian command and control, logistics, intelligence, and force concentration points occur, but are not sufficient to stabilize the line of contact.
Ukrainian logistics are being hampered primarily due to the significantly increased capabilities of Russian small attack drones (FPV), the increasingly intensive use of long-range drones ("Shahed") and missiles at the tactical level (strikes on Pavlohrad and Dobropilya).
On the Russian side, the aggressor continues to be able to exploit its superiority in manpower, artillery, drones, and aviation. At the same time, in recent weeks, it has strengthened the group operating in the Kozeny Torets River area, adding units of the 8th Army with the 51st (operating in the Kostiantynivka sector) and the 2nd (attacking Pokrovsk from the south).
What does this mean?
Is this a breakthrough of the front? So far, more likely than not. The aggressor's small infantry groups, bypassing the Ukrainian positions, have penetrated into the depth of the defense about 10 km. The Ukrainians are trying to break them out, but the Russians are recovering their losses, in individual settlements their forces reach 20 soldiers. How sustainable this bridgehead is will depend on the Ukrainian counterattacks. It remains to be seen what the further dynamics will be.
The Russians are creating conditions to block Pokrovska-Myrnohrad from the north. They can, according to their favorite principle of"crawling wherever they land" and try to attack to the east, blocking Kostyantynivka from the west. That the Russians dream of such a cauldron and are trying to create it is evident from the actions of recent weeks - Russian actions in the northern section of Chasiv Yar are becoming more active.
Will the Russians be able to straddle two chairs? The Russians do not have the forces for a full-fledged operation.
This is evidenced by the fact that it is from the imaginary sections of the cauldron (Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka) that forces are being transferred to the western bank of the Kozeny Torets. However, the most important thing here is how much capacity and reserves the Ukrainians have to stabilize the current situation. If there are no forces, then those small infantry groups of 3-5 soldiers each, changing 10 or 20 times on the death conveyor, will sooner or later crawl to both Dobropilya and Kostiantynivka.
Is the situation bad? Yes. Is the situation catastrophic and will Ukraine lose the war because of it? No.
The loss of Pokrovskoe or Kostyantynivka does not mean the collapse of the front. The rapid fall of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, their entry into the cauldron, does not correspond to the real state of the Russian forces, the available reserves, or the dynamics of the battles. What can we say about Pavlohrad.
Ukraine needs a concentrated effort to stabilize the situation. This is possible. And if it is really impossible, then make decisions by retreating and occupying new lines of defense. But most importantly, solve the systemic problems mentioned above.
Overview of the situation on the front. Donetsk region
The Russians are gradually pushing on the northern section of Časiv Yar, improving their position near the canal.
Nothing dramatic yet - beyond the canal is the Markovė - Novomarkovė section, which has dominant heights. If the Russians manage to cross the canal and grab the heights, then it's no good.
From here, the aggressor could try to cut off the Kostiantynivka defense area from the north (that is, from the rear) or deepen the wedge by approaching Kramatorsk.
The Russians are also pressing in the Dylivka and Jablunivka sectors and are trying to approach Kostiantynivka from the south and southwest.
Pokrovsk - Iskra, eastern flank. The aggressor is expanding its positions in Suvorov, while the nearby Ukrainian defense district of Pokrovsk - Myrnohrad, which is critically important for logistics and defense, is being blocked from the north-northeast.
There are no significant changes in the central section and western flank.
Kursk direction
Ukrainian forces continue to press on the western flank of the Sumy sector. The Ukrainians are gaining ground not only in Kindrativka, but it seems that the Russians are also struggling in Kostiantynivka (about 2 km north of Kindrativka).
The Russian offensive on the eastern flank was stalled. Moreover, the Ukrainians counterattacked at Yunakivka, forcing the Russians to give up several positions.
Luhansk direction
Lyman. The aggressor is trying to build on his success in the forests of the southern flank, this time the Ukrainians managed to defend themselves. However, the situation is complicated.
Zaporizhia direction
The fighting continues in the Plavna - Stepnohirsa section. Here the positions of both sides resemble a layer cake, there is no clear line of contact. Both sides are attacking.
Attacked successfully
Ukrainian forces have successfully attacked the Arzamas plant in the Nizhny Novgorod region, which produces various equipment and components for military and civil aviation.
It also produces components for various missiles, such as the Kh101 and Kh59, which are often used against Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces managed to shoot down or divert 59 drones from their targets using EW means. The Sumy region was most intensively attacked.
