Over the past two days, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit was held in China, bringing together Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The summit presented a scene of a camp seeking to raise the banner of multipolarity and the Global South in opposition to the West. But the big question remains: Can Beijing and Moscow truly shape a new world order?
If we go back a little, we find that the world had a previous experience during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union succeeded in imposing a true balance with Washington. There were two poles, close in military and ideological power, distributing influence and setting the rules of the game. Today, however, the situation is different. Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, and its economy is no larger than Italy's. China, despite its enormous economic power, remains tied to Western markets and technology, making it reluctant to go too far in an open confrontation.
Take, for example, what happened a few weeks ago, when Iran—a key ally of both China and Russia—was subjected to military strikes. Neither Moscow nor Beijing could do anything to prevent them. This illustrates the limits of their power: much rhetoric about confronting hegemony and rejecting unilateralism, but the ability to actually act on the ground remains limited. The global order is not built on slogans, but on the ability to protect allies and impose new rules.
• • •
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has expanded to include countries such as India, Iran, and Turkey as observers, appears at first glance to be a rival to NATO or the G7. However, the truth is that the organization still lacks binding instruments or a clear vision. It is more of a broad forum of divergent interests: China seeks economic leadership, Russia seeks political support amid its Western isolation, India seeks to balance the differences, and Iran seeks an umbrella to protect it from pressure. It is difficult for this mix to transform into a coherent global system.
The equation between Beijing and Moscow itself is unbalanced. Russia, which is waging a protracted war in Ukraine, has become increasingly dependent on China, whether for energy, trade, or even the goods its military industry needs. While China treats it as a stronger partner, it also does not want to bear the cost of a full confrontation with the West. Therefore, it raises slogans of multilateralism and the Global South, but avoids entering into formal military alliances that could cost it broader sanctions or economic isolation.
• • •
India also complicates the picture. It is Asia's third-largest economy, with enormous demographic and political weight. However, it does not clearly belong to any camp. It imports Russian oil at low prices and seeks economic cooperation with China when Washington pressures it with tariffs, yet at the same time remains close to the West in the areas of technology and security. India's presence in any Sino-Russian axis will remain fragile and dependent on shifting interests, meaning that the alternative system project lacks the backbone that the Soviet Union once provided.
It's true that China and Russia are succeeding in confusing the West. Joint military exercises, threats of an alliance with North Korea, and talk of an alternative financial system to the dollar are all steps that increase the anxiety of Washington and its allies. However, these are more tools of pressure and disruption, rather than building blocks for a new global order. For such an order to succeed, it must present the world with an attractive proposition: clear institutions, agreed-upon rules, and general economic and security benefits, which have yet to materialize.
• • •
The bottom line is that the world is moving toward greater pluralism and fragmentation, but without a single architect or camp capable of enforcing the rules. We may see new spheres of influence for China and Russia, and pressure on the traditional Western order may increase, but talk of a new world order led by Beijing and Moscow seems exaggerated. We are facing a turbulent, multipolar world, but without a clear leading pole.
The coming order—if it emerges—will not be purely American, as it was after the Cold War, nor will it be Sino-Russian, as Moscow and Beijing dream of. It is a world open to many possibilities, where everyone can disrupt, but no one can set the rules alone.
