Russian military forces planned to occupy the city by the end of last year — they are almost a year behind schedule.

Ukrainian defenders fought tenaciously to hold the Donbass defensive line, but now they and the entire country face unseen difficulties - from manpower shortages to problems with electricity supply.

Russia is already establishing itself in Pokrovsk — more and more troops are rushing into the destroyed buildings, and Russian drones are cutting off the supply lines of the Ukrainian defenders.

Foreign Affairs notes that Pokrovsk is also not an isolated battle on the Ukrainian front. Russian forces are also advancing in the direction of Kostiantynivka and are gradually advancing towards Kupyansk.

In the event of the collapse of Donbass, Russian aggression will turn to the second largest city in Ukraine, Kharkiv.

Meanwhile, the prospects for negotiations and a ceasefire have dominated international discussions in recent years. As the fourth anniversary of the war approaches, both sides are showing signs of fatigue, but neither is yet ready for peace.

Despite months of efforts by the United States, the Kremlin has still not offered any concessions or changed its maximalist demands. The failure of its Ukrainian partners to apply pressure has allowed Vladimir Putin to stall for time.

Foreign Affairs notes that during the negotiations, the Kremlin increased the intensity of the fighting — with strikes on Ukrainian cities and at the front — to turn the facts in its favor.

The behavior of the international community also contributed to this. The reduction in military and technical support from the United States of America (US) gave the Kremlin hope that it could win on the battlefield.

The West's focus on sending troops into post-war Ukraine has made prolonging the war the best option for Russia, which seeks to prevent Ukraine's integration into the European security architecture.

Meanwhile, Ukraine itself, due to Russia's determination to continue the fight and attack its territory, has no choice but to continue the fight.

To force the Kremlin to reassess the situation, the West will need to choose a different kind of pressure. Otherwise, Ukraine may be forced to surrender.

Three stages

Foreign Affairs highlighted that Russia is still seeking to subjugate Ukraine. To do this, it has planned three stages, only one of which involves actual fighting on the battlefield.

Russia seeks to occupy or destroy a sufficient portion of Ukrainian territory so that the remaining land would be economically viable only with Russia's consent.

Russian planners believe this can be achieved if Russia retains the four regions it has already annexed. At the same time, the occupiers should occupy Kharkiv, Nikolaev, and Odessa.

Under such conditions, the Kremlin would seek a ceasefire, hoping to implement a second phase in which it would control Kyiv using economic and political leverage and the threat of a re-invasion.

In the third stage, Russia would absorb Ukraine into its orbit, similar to Belarus.

However, at present, Russia is far from having succeeded in implementing the first of these stages.

Kremlin planners hope that if the military succeeds in exhausting Ukraine's armed forces, its territorial gains on the battlefield will accelerate.

Foreign Affairs notes that Russia has been on the offensive for two years now. The pressure on Ukraine will only increase — the number of Russian infantrymen in Ukrainian units is decreasing every month, although the total number of the country's troops remains stable.

But Russia will soon face its own challenges in generating more forces. Russia wages war using volunteers who join the army in exchange for huge bonuses and death benefits.

In 2024, Russia employed about 420,000 troops, and in 2025, more than 300,000. This allowed it to conduct continuous, albeit costly, infantry attacks.

However, the number of men who find these incentives attractive is decreasing. In the fall of 2025, recruitment numbers declined or, in some areas, had to be reinforced by coercive recruitment measures.

To maintain the current pace of offensive operations, the Kremlin will either have to develop a way of fighting that better protects the lives of soldiers or find a new recruitment model.

Russia will feel the impact

Foreign Affairs notes that one aspect is important to any recruitment model and military supply: energy sales.

The Kremlin can finance offensive operations at the front only if it has stable sales of oil, gas, and other raw materials.

However, this method of financing has encountered difficulties - with the decline in oil prices, Russia's cash reserves have been depleted.

Ukraine is also adding to the Kremlin's problems. An intensified campaign of long-range strikes has begun to have a significant impact on the country's oil refining and fuel availability.

So far, Russian air defenses have managed to shoot down up to 95 percent of Ukrainian drones. Only about half of the drones that hit their targets have caused significant damage.

However, Foreign Affairs speculates that Ukraine may increase the effectiveness of its strikes in the coming years.

There are two reasons for this. First, Russia is losing more air defense systems than it produces, while Ukraine is accumulating stocks of its own cruise missiles.

Such weapons will have a dual effect: they will be able to hit more targets than drones and they will disperse Russian air defenses, allowing Ukraine to create even more gaps.

Foreign Affairs predicts that if Ukraine attacks the Kremlin's oil export infrastructure, the country will feel even greater impact.

Stopping the Shadow Fleet

Combating the most important source of funding for the Russian war machine requires not only drone strikes, but also pressure on the Russian economy from Ukraine's international partners.

Foreign Affairs notes that a key part of this is combating Russia's shadow fleet, which delivers oil to India and China.

So far, Western measures in this direction have been timid. Sanctions have been imposed on ships, but there has been little enforcement.

Foreign Affairs notes that effectively restricting the shadow fleet is the fastest way to put real pressure on the Kremlin.

Moreover, it would not disrupt the international market and would not cause a price shock.

But some European capitals are resisting tougher measures against Russia's shadow fleet.

Denmark cited the 1857 Copenhagen Treaty as a legal obstacle. This is an international agreement that established duty-free transit of commercial shipping through Danish waters.

"But this is more of an excuse than a real obstacle," Foreign Affairs noted.

The publication noted that the Baltic Sea countries could agree on a new treaty under which ships sailing in these waters would be required to meet certain insurance and certification standards.

The aging ships of the shadow fleet would not meet these requirements and would not be able to enter the straits in the Baltic Sea – and this would not violate the Copenhagen Treaty.

We need to convince V. Putin

Foreign Affairs notes that as a harsh winter approaches, Ukraine's ability to resist the invasion of the occupiers will depend on materials, people, and political will.

Losing access to the Danish Strait would not allow the Russians to quickly resolve this problem.

While Russia can export oil from its eastern coast, the region lacks the infrastructure to move oil to ports.

Another option is export via the Black Sea, but Ukrainian underwater drones could be directed there.

Land routes would also not solve the problem, as they are limited by a lack of infrastructure.

"For now, the Kremlin believes it can afford to keep fighting. Ukraine's international partners will only convince Putin to settle for a ceasefire by clearly setting Russia on a path to economic crisis in the medium term," Foreign Affairs writes.

It is noted that V. Putin must understand that the risks of a prolonged conflict are greater than the expected benefits. Such a strategy may work, but only if Ukraine is able to hold out until 2026.

Three factors

Ukraine's ability to resist further Russian attacks, according to Foreign Affairs, will depend on three key factors: technology, people, and will.

The supply of ammunition to the country's army is now firmly assumed by Europe, which has begun to invest more and more in defense production.

However, the US has almost stopped supplying equipment to Ukraine.

Foreign Affairs raises the key question: will the Donald Trump administration reliably allow the purchase of US-made weapons in areas where Kyiv's international partners lack their own capabilities?

These include items such as Patriot interceptors, guided multiple launch rocket systems, laser-guided 155-millimeter projectiles, and specialized military goods.

Ukraine also faces a difficult manpower situation.

Despite the fact that the country has enough people for combat operations, the number of combat-ready infantry in the Ukrainian army has been decreasing for almost two years.

Foreign Affairs warns that it could reach a level where the country's military will be unable to hold the front. To avoid such an outcome, Kyiv needs to change its approach to force generation.

To this end, it is particularly important to improve the quality and capabilities of infantry training and integration into combat brigades.

Today, more people serve in the Ukrainian military than ever before. However, the country's military is failing to train its personnel to perform front-line combat functions.

To address this growing problem, the new Ukrainian army corps will need to establish brigade rotation and allow more experienced units to engage in training new recruits.

Foreign Affairs notes that Ukraine's international partners can also make a significant contribution in this area.

Over the past three and a half years, many such states have actively participated in training Ukrainian troops outside the country, but this has not yielded the desired results - both due to European peace rules and communication problems.

Send a message to Russia

Foreign Affairs proposes a better model for European aid that could also pave the way for a potential ceasefire.

One of Russia's biggest headaches is Ukraine's integration into Europe and its security arrangements. This has become one of the main obstacles to convincing Russia of a ceasefire.

The publication notes that Russia has a strong incentive to avoid a ceasefire altogether if it would prevent Ukraine's integration into European security arrangements.

"The best way to overcome this obstacle is to completely separate the deployment of European forces in Ukraine from the issue of a ceasefire. European forces could start this process immediately in various ways," the publication notes.

Eastern European states could request permission to combat air threats emerging over Ukrainian airspace and approaching NATO's border.

Such a model would not oblige Poland, Romania, and other countries to attack targets over the country, but would create the prerequisites for the compatibility of European and Ukrainian air defense systems.

"This way, the European coalition could quickly direct airpower to Ukraine," Foreign Affairs writes.

Another important aspect is the military training of European countries inside Ukraine. This would directly address the problems of Ukraine's force formation.

However, this also comes with risks - European instructors would become an attractive target for Russia. However, as the publication states, the Kremlin has not been able to attack Ukrainian instructors often, so this risk is manageable.

Such a European move would also send a message to the Kremlin - prolonging the war will only further harm Russia's interests and undermine post-war security guarantees.

"This would strengthen Ukraine's will to resist today and give it the confidence to reach an agreement when the conditions are right. The country's domestic front needs optimism as it begins what is likely to be the most difficult part of the war so far," the publication writes.

Decisive winter

Foreign Affairs notes that this winter could be decisive for Ukraine.

"Russia is producing more missiles than ever before, and Ukraine's damaged energy grid is no longer able to supply the entire country with energy. Even central Kyiv remains without electricity for several hours every day."

Currently, the heating is working, but temperatures are dropping, so Ukraine must prepare for major disruptions in the provision of utility services during the cold months.

"If Russia manages to accelerate its gains – perhaps by simultaneously breaking down Ukraine's defensive lines and emptying key centers near the front – it could force Ukraine to surrender by 2026," the publication states.

However, this is not a 100% prediction. If Ukraine, together with Western countries, is able to put real pressure on the Russian economy and energy infrastructure, a ceasefire could be achieved by the end of next year.

As Ukraine continues to attack oil infrastructure, Russia may finally realize it is approaching a tipping point.

Meanwhile, Washington must recognize that a ceasefire will not be achieved through symbolic gestures and concessions to Moscow.

"To change the Kremlin's understanding, it will take constant pressure and discipline. Personal agreements between leaders cannot achieve this."

"In Europe, rhetorical belligerence must be balanced with precise policy. Ukraine can still buy time to put pressure on Russia. But it cannot resist indefinitely," the publication concluded.