Last Saturday's article discussed how the Israeli aggression against Iran in June 2015 exacerbated the internal conflict between reformists and conservatives, with their various factions within each, and how this conflict crossed some red lines that there was an implicit agreement not to cross. This week's article focuses on the regional and international contexts in which the internal Iranian conflict is taking place, and how the internal context intersects with the external context.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made a surprising accusation against former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, stating that the snapback mechanism included in the 2015 agreement was agreed upon in the final stages of the nuclear negotiations between Zarif and former US Secretary of State John Kerry. This criticism/accusation was highly serious because it held Zarif responsible for leading Iran into passing the snapback mechanism, which allows, under certain circumstances, the automatic activation of Security Council sanctions without any of the five permanent members of the Council having the right to veto. The seriousness of this accusation goes far beyond its use within the framework of the internal conflict in Iran, which means the possibility of Zarif being tried on charges of high treason. Although the accusation against Lavrov has already been used in the internal Iranian conflict - as the accusation was supported by Ali Akbar Salehi, who was the foreign minister and head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, by confirming that Russia objected at the time to the trigger mechanism - this is only the tip of the iceberg.
At a deeper level, this accusation, and the subsequent fierce counterattack launched by Mohammad Javad Zarif against Russia's negative role in the nuclear negotiations, reflect a deepening crisis of confidence in Russian-Iranian relations. Iran had expected Russia, after supplying it with drones in the Ukraine war, to adopt a more positive stance that went beyond mere diplomatic condemnation of Israeli aggression against Iran. Furthermore, despite all the noise surrounding the deal for Russian Su-35 fighter jets to Iran, there is considerable confusion regarding its developments and outcomes. What is certain, however, is that the process of finalizing the deal faces problems and perhaps even pressures.
In reality, Iran, a highly pragmatic state, should have realized that Russia would find it difficult to adopt a different stance for two main reasons. The first reason is that Russia's priority is certainly Ukraine, not Iran. Therefore, when Putin sits down to negotiate a settlement to the Ukrainian conflict and has to make concessions, he is willing to compromise on the level of his relationship with Iran.
The second reason stems from Russian interests with Israel. These same interests are what made Russia coordinate with Israel to strike Iran and its allies in Syria, at the same time as it stood shoulder to shoulder with Iran to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Had Iran extended this line in its entirety, it would have also understood the circumstances of the return of warmth to Russian-Syrian relations, despite the rise to power of one of the armed factions that Russia was fighting in Syria. Between Russia and Syria there is a complex network of interests that fulfills the basic needs of both parties: bases, warm waters, and influence in the Middle East for one, and energy, diplomatic support, and curbing aggressive Israeli behavior for the other. This is politics, with no permanent friends or enemies.
Later, Iran adopted a more pragmatic approach, and Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, visited Moscow to discuss developing bilateral relations and mitigating the effects of the Lavrov-Zarif crisis. Prior to this, Russia, China, and Iran had requested the UN Secretary-General to postpone the activation of the snapback mechanism. When the postponement was refused, the three countries criticized the activation of the mechanism as illegal and detrimental to peace efforts. This discussion of China leads us to examine its relationship with Iran. Iran's relationship with China is more stable than its relationship with Russia, as the Chinese relationship is free from the long-standing historical anxieties that govern Russian-Iranian relations. Beijing was the first capital visited by Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh immediately after the ceasefire with Israel, seeking to bolster Iran's military capabilities. The timing and priority of this Iranian foreign policy move are significant. The acquisition of J-16 fighter jets is central to Iranian negotiations with China regarding arms purchases, and there are also discussions concerning the import of components for manufacturing Iran's medium-range ballistic missiles from China.
However, in the case of China, as with Russia, the military aspect of the relationship with Iran is shrouded in ambiguity. Just as Russia has interests with Israel, so too does China. Furthermore, numerous issues remain unresolved between China and the United States, including the Iranian file, and these issues could be traded off against one another. Therefore, it was not surprising that China adopted the same stance as Russia regarding the Israeli aggression against Iran: strongly condemning the aggression but without any direct involvement. This is because, in addition to China's consideration of balancing its interests, military intervention is not among its tools for achieving its foreign policy objectives. Consequently, Iranian political criticism has been directed far more at Russia than China, even reaching the point where Mohammad Sadr, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, accused Russia of providing Israel with information about Iranian air defense sites.
Two points remain regarding the external context. First, Iran has come to realize that any agreement with the European troika on its nuclear program is doomed to failure without the United States. The troika itself has also come to realize this. This narrows Iran's options, as it is forced to negotiate with the United States while simultaneously facing staunch American intransigence regarding enrichment. Second, the Iranian attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar has revived Gulf concerns about the Iranian threat, after what appeared to be a new chapter in Gulf-Iranian relations.
