"Now it is absolutely crucial how the trilateral summit will turn out, it is quite possible that it will even be this month," thinks political scientist, educator and expert on Ukraine and Russia ALEXANDER DULEBA. In the ARÉNA program with Jana Krescanko Dibáková, he analyzes the situation after the historic meeting in the Oval Office. The situation for Ukraine, with strong leaders behind it, is better than before, and the security guarantees can be compared to membership in NATO.

Duleba emphasizes that the original Russian demand to achieve the security situation before 1997 is unrealistic and Ukraine, with the support of the US and other countries, will soon have one of the most advanced armies:"The Russians are giving in a lot on the issue of demilitarizing Ukraine. The compromise is that Ukraine will not be a member of NATO, but the guarantees for Ukraine will be of the nature of Article 5. This is not mentioned, but 32 countries of the"coalition of the willing" were connected online to the negotiations - including Japan, Australia, New Zealand.

"When Trump is dealing with such a coalition of countries, he cannot afford to ignore any Ukrainian perspective."

However, according to Duleb, for Donald Trump, it is also about the economic outcome of the negotiations; he has managed to occupy the European energy market and thus push out Russia. That is why he can take greater interest in security on the old continent. However, this will be associated with another overseas benefit - the American arms industry will have prosperous years ahead, which will be reflected in the modernization of the Ukrainian army:"Ukraine will be armed to the teeth. The goal of demilitarizing Ukraine is an absolute chimera."

Should Ukraine be more optimistic or realistic after Volodymyr Zelensky's talks with Donald Trump and subsequently with European leaders?

Ukraine is certainly more optimistic today than it was after the Alaskan summit between Trump and Putin. Many expected Trump to pressure Zelensky into territorial concessions and similar compromises, which did not happen. There is now a clear agreement from Washington that this is a Ukrainian matter.

Zelenskyy himself said that there was a big debate about it. They showed each other on maps what really happened, because the illusion persists that the Russian army is winning and the Ukrainians cannot defend themselves. On those maps, they went over in detail what happened and how much territory the Russians actually occupied in three and a half years.

So the key thing now is how the bilateral summit turns out. It will definitely take place, and it is quite possible that it will take place this month - within two or three weeks.

People first, security then, territories last

So what do you expect from the Zelensky - Putin meeting?

At the very least, they could agree on the principle of"all for all" - that is, the exchange of all prisoners. The Ukrainians are also demanding the return of 19,000 abducted children.

Trump's wife even wrote a letter to Putin to return these children. Ukraine is demanding not only the exchange of all prisoners and soldiers, but also civilians. In addition, they are demanding the release of political prisoners - Russian citizens who protested against the war.

The European Union and the coalition of the willing are primarily addressing security guarantees. On the other hand, there are also territorial claims and requirements. Where have the negotiations progressed?

The Russians are backing down, and a lot, on the issue of demilitarizing Ukraine. The compromise is that Ukraine will not be a member of NATO, a proposal by Italian Prime Minister Meloni.

Security guarantees for Ukraine are being discussed, which should have the character of Article 5. There is a coalition of the willing, which includes 32 countries.

During the negotiations, not only Zelensky and seven European leaders were present in the second part of the summit, but leaders of 32 countries, including Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, joined online.

When dealing with such a coalition of countries, Trump simply cannot afford to ignore the Ukrainian perspective.

Moreover, we have commitments with Trump. During his mandate, it is planned to buy oil and natural gas from the United States for 750 billion euros. European companies and the European Commission will probably prepare a stimulus instrument to invest 600 billion in this. Trump does not have such a commitment with anyone else.

So we're talking about a new geopolitical reality?

This was not a bilateral Trump-Zelensky summit. This summit was the US and Europe, because it is about European security. Ukraine's allies here were also Trump's allies.

According to the findings from Alaska, they have reportedly agreed on a framework compromise. If the Ukrainians hand over to Russia roughly one-third of the Donetsk region, which Ukraine still controls and the Russians are unable to conquer, the Russians promise to accept it, plus they will freeze the front line of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions and are ready to return smaller sections in the north - including the Sumy and Kharkiv regions.

Putin narrowed the goals of his special military operation to the acquisition of certain territories, while before the war he demanded the return of the European security system of 1997. So they agreed in Alaska that if the Ukrainians made these territorial concessions, they would receive security guarantees. Ukraine would not be a member of NATO, but it would receive these guarantees.

The key message from the Washington talks is that the United States is coming on board. Ukraine will get a security package, including weapons worth about $100 billion, and European countries are willing to finance it. These are American weapons that will be sold - a good"deal" for Trump.

At the same time, there are key allies like British Prime Minister Starmer, French President Macron, Merz and others, because Ukraine mainly needs intelligence information.

Demilitarization of Ukraine? A Chimera

If we compare what Article 5 of NATO is – that is, the intervention of the entire alliance in the event that one of the member countries is attacked – and now we have a situation in Ukraine, which is to some extent similar to Article 5, where there is clear collective support, what is the difference?

It is a de facto NATO membership, but not de jure. I want to draw attention to how the Russian position has shifted since the peace negotiations that took place at the beginning of the war in March, April and May 2022. At that time, the Russians accepted that Ukraine could have security guarantees bilaterally, but in order for countries to be able to act in case of need, i.e. to defend Ukraine, the UN Security Council had to agree to it. But Russia has the right of veto, which the Ukrainians did not agree to.

Now the Russians are not talking about such a condition of these security guarantees. If the compromise is fulfilled – that is, Ukraine receives security guarantees and hands over one third of the Donetsk region – de facto not only will there be no steps towards demilitarization, but Ukraine will be armed, because the guarantees are supposed to include arming the Ukrainian army.

Zelensky has already submitted a list of at least ten Patriot systems from the Americans, along with missiles and other equipment.

Ukraine will therefore be armed to the teeth. The goal of demilitarizing Ukraine is therefore an absolute chimera. The question remains how Putin will explain such an agreement, and we can count on it being practically impossible.

How can he accept this when the practical consequence will be very similar? What will it look like in practice?

The Coalition of the Willing has been working for several months on what security guarantees for Ukraine should look like. This is not done by politicians, but by the chiefs of general staff of the armies who are part of this coalition. I emphasize again that these are not only European countries, but also Japan, Australia and New Zealand, which are also part of the Coalition of the Willing to support Ukraine.

They argue about which country can contribute what - Zelenskyy also talked about this when he mentioned partners and areas where Ukraine has deficits, for example in air defense, ground force training, and other areas.

France and Great Britain have declared their willingness to send a peacekeeping contingent, but Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zakharova has rejected this, saying that direct deployment of troops from these countries is an option.

This entire concept of peace negotiations has been narrowed down to a compromise regarding approximately one-third of the Donetsk region, thanks to Trump's pressure.

The long road to redrawing the map

We know that the Ukrainian president cannot just sign the handover of a part of the territory, because it would essentially be considered treason and Volodymyr Zelensky could be criminally liable for it. The question is whether the borders will shift, whether a so-called no-man's land will be created, or whether it will be a territory where the inhabitants will formally or informally belong to Russia. Will the map be redrawn or will there be some form of special status for these territories?

Quickly, physically, the map can be redrawn, because each soldier controls a certain territory. But this is part of the compromise: one thing is security guarantees, another question is whether Ukraine is ready to"pay" the price for that one third of the Donetsk region.

It is not possible at the moment. Zelensky has openly said in interviews that he will not act against the constitution, the Ukrainian constitution defines the territory of Ukraine and he will not change it. Ukraine de jure will not be able to admit that it is giving up these territories, that is a red line.

But Zelensky said the only way would be for a referendum to be held, changing the constitution and giving him the authority to agree to hand over part of the territory. However, a referendum is only possible once the fighting ends and a stable ceasefire is guaranteed.

Elections are similarly restricted. The Law on the Functioning of the Country in a State of War explicitly prohibits any elections – neither municipal, regional, nor central elections are held during a state of war.

Is there political will in Ukraine to approve changes?

Personally, I doubt that Ukrainian society would be able to quickly master all the necessary processes now, after the theoretical end of the fighting. Let's imagine that the fighting stopped for a few months, it would still not be enough. Trump may aspire to the Nobel Peace Prize, but it will certainly not be a reality this year.

Part of a potential deal between Putin and Zelensky could be for the Russians to say, “We’re stopping the fighting, but you hold a referendum or an election.” However, in order to prepare for a central election, parliamentary and presidential elections must also take place, which could be combined with a referendum on constitutional amendments. Personally, I highly doubt that these elections and referendums could realistically take place so quickly.

In 2026?

We are optimistic. But it is still questionable whether anything will be achieved if the fighting stops.

Achieving peace will be very difficult. The only situation that Ukrainian society could accept is if there is peace, security guarantees work, there is a development perspective, and the Russians pay reparations, freezing $300 billion that would be used to compensate for the damage.

Such a concession will not be easy, as the Russians were unable to conquer major agglomerations such as Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, north of Pokrovsk.

Pokrovsk is about five times smaller than Kramatorsk. Kramatorsk is something like Mariupol, with major metallurgical companies. Mariupol and Kherson were two larger cities that the Russians occupied during the so-called special operation.

Horrible scenes took place in Mariupol, Ukrainians will not forget them...

But not only that, the Ukrainians liberated Kherson and Mariupol defended itself in a complete encirclement for three months. Metallurgical plants provide reinforced concrete guilds, underground passages and warehouses that are ideal for defense.

Kramatorsk is not surrounded, so the Russians could hold out for two more years, not just three months. The Ukrainians explained to Trump why Kramatorsk and Sloviansk were so important to them. To the north beyond them is Kharkiv, a key Ukrainian city, with no other major cities.

Does this mean they could continue, which would bring even greater risk in the future?

The Russians would have an open path. Simply put, you will not build such defensive lines to replace what the experience of this war has shown. After all, the Russians are not able to conquer, for example, Bakhmut, it took them three months.

Avdiivka as well, they are small towns compared to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. That's why the Russians are advancing very slowly.

With the technologies they use - mainly drones - heavy military equipment is de facto paralyzed.

The Russians are not attacking en masse, but are advancing in small groups, a few hundred meters, digging in, holding their positions, bringing in reinforcements, and moving forward like that. British intelligence estimated that if this style of advance continued, it would take about two years to capture one-third of the Donetsk region. It is therefore strategically crucial for the Ukrainians to hold these cities. The Finnish president, by the way, a very interesting political scientist, often points to this situation.

What attracted you?

Finnish President Alexander Stubb, the author of the theory of differentiated integration, has written an article that is among the most cited in political science journals. I am very glad that such an expert is the President of Finland.

According to some information, he said that Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are “fortresses against the Huns.” Of course, this is exaggerated, but these cities really play a key role in terms of Ukrainian security, European security, and also in providing guarantees to Ukraine.

Therefore, Zelensky cannot promise Putin the handover of these areas at the next summit.

If European leaders explained this situation to Donald Trump, did he better understand what was going on and overcome his initial affinity for Vladimir Putin, which he evidently had at the beginning of the year?

His main motivation is indeed the Nobel Peace Prize. He allegedly called the Norwegian Foreign Minister before the Alaska summit, according to several sources, and asked if he would receive the Nobel Prize if he negotiated peace. We don't know exactly what they told him there, but he really wants it.

The art of diplomacy, the power of flattery. A"deal"

The question is whether the political scene can explain to Ukrainians the idea of giving up part of their territory in exchange for security guarantees. On the other hand, they will face counter-questions: What were our people and our men dying for in Donbas?

This could be justified. It was in Trump's circle after the Alaskan summit that this idea arose - let's give Ukraine security guarantees so that Zelensky can"sell" it at home.

In the context of negotiations and balancing between both sides, this would mean - we will give you guarantees, the Americans will also go along with it, but you have to make a territorial concession.

But Zelensky can't do it now. You may have noticed at the joint press conference that he didn't rule it out, it was probably tactical. The British taught him how to communicate with Trump. And it was visible - a nice coat, compliments that he finally had a stylish suit.

Flatter, flatter, flatter?

Yes, flatter and flatter. Herbert McMaster, Trump's first national security adviser during his first term, once attended a meeting with Putin and described it very accurately.

Putin uses four classic methods that are also known for recruiting agents by secret services. Trump is much more manipulable than most politicians, so these techniques work even more strongly on him.

Putin is a master at this, as evidenced by Merkel, Macron, and Scholz, who believed at the beginning of the war that he could be negotiated with and came to see him at the famous long table during the pandemic. His tactics are based on four steps: flatter, find common enemies or friends, convince the partner that"the two of us can do great things," and finally claim that there is no better alternative.

In Trump's case, he sought to provoke conflict with the European Union because it was key to Russian strategy.

He wanted Europe to look like a warmonger and Trump a peacemaker who would stop sending weapons. But this plan didn't work out because the Europeans essentially"bought" Trump with a $750 billion deal.

This is a problem for Putin, as Europe was his main oil and gas market, which he has now lost.

However, Trump needs not only flattery, but also concrete business, and that exists between him and Europe. That is why the summit turned out the way it did. Putin understood that he would not drive a wedge between the US and Europe. Trump is his last chance to get out of the war and save face that he could sell at home.

The result is that he will have to accept security guarantees for Ukraine at the level of NATO Article 5, even if he does not become a member of the alliance. Ukraine will become a heavily armed army, the likes of which in Europe is perhaps only possessed by the Turks. Plans for a special military operation, for the so-called denazification and destruction of the political regime, will not be fulfilled and the only thing left for Putin is the pursuit of some territorial gain.

Putin will certainly say at home, and propaganda will help him, that the capture of Donbass is a great victory, that this very territory was key. But when Russian propaganda, Putin and his henchmen talk about the need to eliminate"security reasons" or "the very origin of conflicts," we have to ask what this actually means. How to decipher it? How to eliminate them?

Before the war, Moscow issued its ultimatum – to return the European security system to 1997. Why this year? That was when NATO decided to expand to include the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, thus beginning the first wave of enlargement. At the same time, however, the Russians negotiated a revision of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

This revision set national ceilings for all OSCE countries – both European states and former Soviet republics – on how many tanks, aircraft, artillery and soldiers they could maintain.

And, most advantageously for Russia, Foreign Minister Primakov also managed to enforce so-called regional ceilings. This meant that if countries joined NATO, heavy equipment or larger military units from old member states were not allowed to move into their territory.

The result was clear – instead of militarizing, we disarmed. When the Czech Republic and Slovakia split, Slovakia had an army of 70,000. Today, it has only about 12,000 professional soldiers, and compulsory military service has been abolished. This was a direct consequence of this treaty, although few people realize it.

But in 2007, Russia withdrew from the treaty. It was Vladimir Putin's famous Munich speech when he announced that he was entering into open confrontation with the West.

So when he talks about"going back to 1997" today, he really means the liquidation of NATO's eastern flank - the removal of military infrastructure, no bases, no soldiers. But today we already have troops from Spain, the Czech Republic, Hungary and other countries participating in joint planning and defense.

Crimea? A big question mark

Is Crimea irretrievably lost to Ukraine?

No. In politics and history, never say “never”. We have many examples, for example Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation there has been de facto similar since the 1980s. Such divisions can be temporarily “frozen”. For example South and North Yemen. Germany was once divided like this, but we see that the situation has changed.

We have many examples: Abkhazia, South Ossetia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova – we recognize these countries in their territorial integrity according to official borders, but we do not recognize these enclaves.

Ukrainians could change the constitution to give powers to the president or other bodies, perhaps make some compromises, but they certainly shouldn't hand over the territory.

So Crimea will never be fully Russian, as Vladimir Putin now imagines?

Crimea is de facto Russian, it is under Russian control, but the Russians would also like official recognition as part of some agreement.

Interestingly, they are talking about Crimea, not about other areas that they have already written into the constitution – Crimea plus four other areas. However, it is still not clear, even from the American side, whether Crimea should be recognized only by the United States or by all, and whether it should be part of some peace agreement.

No welfare, war economy

What currently influences Russian decision-making in war the most?

What worries Russians the most is the economy. Time is not on Putin's side. Russians are in big trouble and the end of this year is likely to be quite dramatic. In September, they will revise the state budget for the second time, as the deficit is growing dramatically and defense spending is growing faster than planned.

Now we are not just talking about the weapons themselves, but also, for example, about the families of soldiers who receive financial support?

All of this is related to the war. The issue is whether there is money in the state budget for the war or not. So primarily we have to monitor how the state budget is being fulfilled or not. And the deficit is growing rapidly.

They planned 1.2 trillion rubles for this year, but it's already five trillion, so they had to revise the budget. If it continues at this pace, it could be eight trillion or more by the end of the year.

The problem is that Russians cannot borrow on the financial markets. The only option is a government loan, for example from China.

Is this even realistic?

That would be the end of Russia. How much can they borrow? They need financing for two years. If it's about a hundred billion and the deficit grows to eight to ten trillion, it's still about a hundred billion. So they might need 200 billion to secure an annual reserve to continue the war. If they don't want to be completely dependent, it has to be well thought out.

It was even something that was tested in Alaska. Marco Rubio, when he started working in the Trump administration, mentioned that there was a chance to make a deal with the Russians against China. The question is whether Russia will be a player who can play with the US against China when they take such a government loan.

Although Trump is grateful to Putin for Russian interference in 2016, which was demonstrably in his favor in the election.

The whole thing ultimately went to waste because Trump replaced the FBI director in 2020. Everything was closed,"swept under the rug," because it was not possible to clearly prove that Trump and his team knowingly collaborated with Russia.

However, this does not change the fact that the Russians' intervention in favor of Trump has been clearly proven. So Trump is grateful to them. On the one hand, he is a great narcissist and egocentric, but now something else is crucial for the US - the number one problem is China. And the relationship between China and Russia can fundamentally influence further American policy.

So the question is: will the Russians take a loan from China? If so, they can ignore Trump completely. And what can they start doing after that? They can print money, but that automatically leads to hyperinflation. They can also tap into people's savings - there are about 60 trillion rubles that people have deposited in banks.

Ordinary Russians, the aging population, may not be able to handle these measures, right?

Putin has no good solutions to deal with the growing deficit, because until now he has always drawn from the National Welfare Fund, where they had savings from previous years. The state budget is always planned with the assumption of a certain oil price - which directly accounts for approximately 27 percent of state revenues. If taxes and companies operating in the oil sector are also included, it is up to 60 percent.

And what did Trump do? He took away the European market. As a result of the war, Russia lost its European oil and gas supplies. Trump has now agreed with Europe to buy its oil, and he is also letting Venezuela, a very oil-rich country, onto the market. The price of oil is going down, which we can also see in the situation in OPEC. This is very bad news for the projected revenues of the Russian state budget. They are left with only two countries that buy most of Russian oil – India and China, and they now buy about 80 percent.

Ukrainians will no longer elect a pro-Russian president

Is it possible that through influence operations on Ukrainian territory, Russia will succeed - as in several European countries - in influencing the elections in Ukraine? Couldn't someone like Yanukovych or a similar pro-Russian candidate emerge in the future?

I exclude that. If Zelensky were to start negotiations with Putin under the current circumstances, he would become a quasi-Yanukovych for Ukrainians. There is no room for another political Yanukovych. Let us realize how the war has changed the lives of Ukrainians - four million of them have fled to EU countries. At least ten million Russian-speaking Ukrainians are now internally displaced, living in western Ukraine - people from Kharkiv, Kherson and the occupied territories, whose lives were destroyed by the war. These people no longer have any illusions about Russia, those illusions tend to remain at home.

However, with elections to be held in 16 EU member states in the next two years, a political force could emerge that could push a sovereignist or more radical agenda and thus change policy.