More than a month ago, Donald Trump was in Saudi Arabia denouncing the “interventionists” trying to reshape the Middle East. The president chose not to stop in Israel on his return, indicating his strained relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was also facing a series of political crises at home. Instead, Trump was eager to negotiate with Iran, which he hoped would become a “real success.” He shared a video of a senior adviser to Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, proposing a deal on its nuclear weapons program.
These seem like scenes from another world. Israel declared war on Iran on June 13, a decision that will transform the Middle East. A week later, Netanyahu is wildly popular, overseeing a campaign he has dreamed of for decades. Trump seems to have forgotten his qualms about intervention. He could send US troops into the fight; he has called for Iran's “unconditional surrender.” As for Khamenei, he is in hiding. The advisor in the video, Ali Shamkhani, was the target of an Israeli assassination attempt and is either dead or seriously wounded.
Israel claimed to have decided to declare war after obtaining intelligence indicating that Iran had “significantly accelerated” the construction of a nuclear weapon. It has not publicly corroborated this claim. It has shared information with its allies, although not all are convinced. There is no doubt that Iran had enriched 400 kg of uranium to 60% purity, slightly below weapons-grade, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN nuclear watchdog. US spies also believe Iran was researching other aspects of bomb-making. However, they doubt that Iran was as close to building one as Israel claims.
The debate now seems almost academic. The die is cast. Israel is in the middle of what Netanyahu has described as a two-week campaign. But the war could drag on before it ends and might not conclude as planned. Three factors will determine what happens next: how long Israel and Iran can sustain a costly, long-term war; whether Trump forces the United States into the fray; and whether Khamenei will accept concessions to save his imperiled regime.
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Since the war began before dawn on June 13, Israel has assassinated Iran's top generals and nuclear scientists, destroyed air defenses in the west of the country, and bombed several nuclear facilities. However, it has yet to damage Iran's main nuclear facility at Fordow, dug into the side of a mountain at a depth too great for the reach of Israeli weapons. That is where it hopes to enlist American help.
More than 500 people have been killed in Israeli attacks, authorities say, many of them civilians. Highways out of Tehran are clogged with traffic as residents flee. Gas stations are rationing fuel.
Iran has responded with daily ballistic missile barrages, primarily targeting Tel Aviv and Haifa, two of Israel's largest cities. The projectiles have forced Israelis to seek shelter every few hours. Most have been shot down by Israeli and American air defenses or missed their targets and landed in deserted locations. However, a few dozen have managed to pass through the area; at least 24 Israelis have been killed.
Still, Israeli officials say the first week has gone largely as planned. Attacks on nuclear facilities and the assassinations of scientists are preventing Iran from building a bomb quickly. Domestically, damage from Iranian missiles has been less than expected. In the second week of fighting, Israel will likely attack Fordow, with or without the United States.
At some point, both Israel and Iran will have to find a way to stop it. Their war is peculiar: their capitals are 1,500 km apart and they share no border. A plane taking off from Israel crosses two other countries before reaching Iranian airspace. Neither side can sustain a long-distance air war indefinitely. “It’s almost impossible to win decisively,” says Amos Yadlin, a former Israeli general.
Before the start of the conflict, Iran was believed to have possessed some 2,000 ballistic missiles with sufficient range to reach Israel. It has fired some 400 of them; the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) estimates it has destroyed roughly the same number in airstrikes. This leaves Iran with a considerable arsenal, hidden in deep underground tunnels. However, its salvos have been dwindling, from more than 150 on the night of June 13 to just 30 six days later.
It may be rationing missiles for fear of a protracted conflict. However, it is more likely to have difficulty launching them. Its missile bases are under constant threat from Israeli planes and drones. When a mobile launcher prepares to fire, it is vulnerable. The Israel Defense Forces say they have already hit about 120 of them, a third of the total. “The complete collapse of Iran’s air defenses means that Iran cannot maneuver effectively,” says Decker Eveleth of CNA, a US think tank. Iran has other weapons in its arsenal. But Israel has so far shot down every drone launched from Iran. Cruise missiles, which fly lower and slower than their ballistic brethren, are also easier to stop.
Ballistic missiles have destroyed numerous buildings in Tel Aviv, destroyed an oil refinery in Haifa, and damaged military bases. They have not caused nearly the destruction that could hamper Israel's war effort or force it to stop fighting. Still, every night is a trial by fire.
War also poses a fiscal burden. Since October 7, 2023, when Hamas, a Palestinian militant group, massacred nearly 1,200 people, Israel has spent approximately NIS 300 billion ($85 billion) on various wars. This was before the campaign against Iran. An Israeli economist who advises the government estimates that the jet fuel and munitions used to attack Iran cost NIS 1 billion a day. Each interceptor launched by Arrow, Israel's ballistic missile defense system, costs about $3 million, and the Israel Defense Forces typically fire more than one for each incoming missile. Israel's stockpile of these interceptors is also limited, although hundreds more have been manufactured in recent months.
Concern about a protracted war is one reason Israel craves U.S. aid so much. Until last November, it was hard to imagine a U.S. president even giving Israel the green light for a war against Iran, let alone joining it. Barack Obama banned an Israeli strike during his first term. He subsequently negotiated a nuclear deal with Iran during his second, making it impossible for Israel to act unilaterally. Joe Biden urged restraint after two rounds of Iranian ballistic missile attacks against Israel last year.
At first, it looked as though Trump would do the same. He campaigned on a promise to end America's"endless wars" in the Middle East. In April, he dispatched Steve Witkoff, his personal envoy, to the first of five rounds of negotiations with Iran. The president sounded optimistic even in late May, when he praised a"very, very good" round of talks with Abbas Araghchi, Iran's foreign minister.
By early June, however, Trump's tone had changed. He began to suspect that Iran was stalling and unwilling to make concessions. Still, Witkoff had scheduled a sixth round of talks for June 15. But behind the scenes, Netanyahu and US hawks urged Trump to give Israel the green light. He did so days before the war began, although he seemed to have reservations about it.
However, Trump's concerns seemed to dissipate on the morning of June 13, when he awoke to the news of the successful first round of Israeli strikes. He quickly adopted the war plan as his own. For a president passionate about quick wins, the idea of joining Israel and attacking Fordow certainly holds appeal.
But it could be more complicated than Trump thinks. For starters, the U.S. might have to make more than a few incursions. Iran has been anticipating a war in the Persian Gulf for decades. It has air defense batteries and missile bases along its southern coast, many of which remain intact as Israel has concentrated its efforts in western Iran. Iranian naval forces have trained to use fast attack boats, anti-ship missiles, and mines against U.S. warships and merchant vessels. The U.S. would likely have to destroy some of this to protect both its own aircraft and its allies in the region.
Then there is the question of how Iran might retaliate. It would almost certainly turn to its allies. Militias in Iraq have already threatened to attack the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and U.S. troops elsewhere in the country. The Houthis, a Shiite militia in Yemen, could resume their attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
A more serious escalation would be for Iran itself to attack its Gulf neighbors. It could fire on the US naval base in Bahrain, home to its Fifth Fleet, or the Al-Udeid air base in Qatar. Or it could attack Gulf countries directly, firing missiles and drones at Saudi oil fields, for example, as it did in 2019. It could also block the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world's oil supply passes.
Some of this would be counterproductive. Attacks on Gulf countries would sour Iran's relations with its neighbors and might prompt them to retaliate. Blocking the strait would upset China, which imports nearly all of Iran's crude. It would also disrupt Iranian imports, particularly of gasoline: while a major oil producer, its aging refineries struggle to meet domestic demand. Still, the regime might try it anyway, hoping that the chaos in the Gulf would force countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to plead with Trump for a cease-fire.
Arab diplomats have already urged an end to the war. European diplomats have also been quick to call for a"de-escalation." This would satisfy Iran: Araghchi has told foreign diplomats that his country is willing to accept an immediate ceasefire.
But this is impossible for Israel, which spent years planning the war and refuses to stop prematurely. It is working through a so-called"target bank": after bombing Iran's air defenses and some of its nuclear facilities, it has moved on to factories that produce centrifuges, used to enrich uranium, and missiles. The question is what will happen when Israel runs out of targets."Israel can achieve tangible results in a few days," says Mr. Yadlin."But for that, we also need a diplomatic exit strategy, and Netanyahu has not been adept at designing one."
Trump's intentions are uncertain. On June 18, he told the press,"Nobody knows what I'm going to do." The day before, he claimed he was seeking something"better than a ceasefire." As always, his comments are ambiguous: do they suggest the United States is planning to join the war? Or that he is seeking more comprehensive diplomacy?
His supporters would prefer the latter. A poll by The Economist and YouGov, published on June 17, found that 60% of Americans opposed joining the conflict between Israel and Iran, while only 16% were in favor. The numbers were similarly uneven among respondents who voted for Trump last year: 53% against, 19% in favor.
If Trump opts for diplomacy, he will want something more restrictive than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement Obama reached with Iran to curb its nuclear program. At the very least, Israel and the United States would expect Iran to give up domestic uranium enrichment. Before the war, Witkoff proposed establishing a regional consortium to refine this material. It could have included Saudi Arabia, which is interested in building nuclear reactors; the United Arab Emirates, which already has four; and Iran. But Iran opposed the idea, insisting it would maintain its own enrichment facilities. The proposal will return to the table in future negotiations.
This is not the first time the United States has sought a zero-enrichment agreement. Obama also requested one early in his presidency, but Iran refused to even discuss the idea. He ultimately settled for an agreement that allowed Iran to enrich uranium to 3.67%, the level needed for nuclear power, with limits on its stockpile of both uranium and centrifuges. Iran may now be forced to be more flexible. Faced with a military threat, the regime has two objectives: to preserve a minimal possibility of a nuclear program, which it views as a long-term insurance policy; and, finally, to survive: to end the war before its weakness prevents it from retaining power.
Over time, these goals could come into conflict. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's first supreme leader, compared accepting the ceasefire agreement to drinking from a poisoned chalice. His successor may have to choose between two options: “One that risks the collapse of the regime in the short term and another that could endanger it in the long term,” argues Raz Zimmt of Israel's Institute for National Security Studies.
What if the regime refuses to budge? Khamenei is stubborn even at the best of times, and many Iranians question his decision-making ability, especially now that he has lost some of his closest advisers. One possibility is that Israel, and perhaps the United States, will try to overthrow him. Toppling the regime is not an official aim of the war. But some of the targets Israel has attacked, such as the state broadcaster, appear to be aimed at destabilization. Yet the regime is tenacious, and what happens next is uncertain.
“There is no definitive solution for Israel unless it engages with the United States or the regime falls,” says one Western diplomat. “Both are big gambles.” On the other hand, perhaps Mr. Netanyahu doesn’t believe he needs a definitive solution. If the war ends after two weeks, and without a nuclear deal, Iran will still be at its weakest point in nearly 40 years. Its missile program and air defenses are in shambles. Its nuclear project is already five to six months behind schedule, even if Fordow remains intact.
Perhaps more importantly, the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic is in jeopardy: Even conservatives are furious at the regime's abject failure to protect the homeland. It may survive the war, but it is hardly stable in the weeks and months that follow. And what happens next may not be Israel's immediate concern. Being 1,500 km away has its advantages.
The countries closest to Iran are more nervous. Gulf leaders fear various adverse outcomes. Iran could fragment, with ethnic separatists causing trouble near its borders with Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. Or the clerical regime could give way to a military one, which might be tempted to try to obtain a nuclear bomb clandestinely to deter future attacks. In the first scenario, Iran would resemble Libya; in the second, it would be North Korea. Neither option is attractive to its neighbors.
There are also more optimistic scenarios. Khamenei is elderly and unpopular; one way or another, he won't last long in power. His decades-long effort to bring Iran to the nuclear threshold, protected by a circle of intermediaries, has ended in disaster. His successor could sensibly decide to chart a different, less confrontational and ideological course. But, as with so much else in this conflict, there are no guarantees.
