The Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, Staffan de Mistura – whose position this resolution clearly reinstates – declared in Brussels that he was now eagerly awaiting an updated version of the Moroccan plan. He specified that the resolution was important for its content, that it reflected renewed international energy and determination, and that it established a framework but did not prescribe specific outcomes for the negotiations. According to him, this text constitutes a basis for negotiation, just like the Polisario Front document and other enduring ideas. He concluded: “To commit does not automatically mean accepting the outcome. The important thing is to participate.”
This is precisely the problem. Why? Because Resolution 2797 is of a completely different nature. It aims to advance the political process, notably through continued consultations between the Personal Envoy and Morocco, the Polisario Front, Algeria, and Mauritania, in order to consolidate the progress achieved. It emphasizes the urgency of resuming the political process and welcomes the Personal Envoy's initiative to bring the parties together to maintain momentum and seize this unprecedented opportunity to reach a lasting solution. While the resolution does not set an explicit deadline, it is clear that this process cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely. What matters now is Morocco's submission of an updated version of the Autonomy Initiative, which it submitted to the Security Council on April 11, 2007.
This foundational text comprises 35 points, organized into three main parts: Morocco's commitment to a definitive political solution; the basic elements of the Moroccan proposal (powers of the Sahara Autonomous Region, regional bodies – parliament and Head of Government – and the representation of the State in the Region); and finally, the process for approving and implementing the autonomy statute. As stipulated in point 27, this statute will be subject to negotiations and submitted to a free referendum of the populations concerned. This referendum thus enshrines the free exercise, by these populations, of their right to self-determination. Point 28 adds that, to this end, the parties commit to working together, in good faith, towards this political solution and its approval by the populations of the Sahara. In the same spirit, the Moroccan Constitution will be revised, the plan specifying that the status of autonomy will be incorporated therein as a guarantee of its stability and its special place in the national legal order.
Can Algeria and the separatist movement refuse the meetings and negotiations proposed by the Personal Envoy to the United States? Until now, these two actors, who had participated in two roundtables in Switzerland (in December 2018 and March 2019), had subsequently rejected this format. — Mustapha Sehimi
Based on the updated Moroccan plan, negotiations can then begin under the auspices of the Personal Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, on American soil, as stipulated in the resolution. This explicitly stated choice demonstrates Washington's particular interest in advancing—and ultimately resolving—a dispute that has lasted for half a century. Will there be several rounds of negotiations, with thematic working groups between the parties? Very likely. A summary of conclusions will need to be drawn up, recording points of convergence and divergence regarding the final status of the territory, it being understood that this will fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty, as the resolution itself reiterates.
Beyond political and institutional issues, the question of governance will also be central to the discussions, with explicit references to human rights and fundamental freedoms: strengthening monitoring by UN mechanisms (OHCHR, MINURSO), confidence-building and reconciliation measures—particularly family visits—and guarantees of democratic participation and protection of civil liberties. Numerous humanitarian issues will also need to be addressed. In particular, the question of refugee identification arises, a process to which Algeria has consistently opposed it. The tens of thousands of people living in the five Tindouf camps belong to various Sahelian and other nationalities. However, only those who can prove their Moroccan citizenship will be included in this process.
Another complex undertaking is the disarmament and potential reintegration of thousands of demobilized members of the separatist movement's armed militias. Algeria, as the host country, will be directly confronted with this major challenge. It will be up to Algeria to take the appropriate measures, as Morocco cannot accommodate certain categories of refugees. The issue of repatriation will be addressed through dedicated programs. The Kingdom had already committed, in its autonomy plan (point 30), to taking all necessary measures (…) for full reintegration into the national community, under conditions guaranteeing the dignity of repatriated persons, their safety, and the protection of their property. To this end, a general amnesty is planned. Following an agreement between the parties, a transitional council, composed of their representatives, will be established. It will provide assistance to operations related to the approval and implementation of the autonomy statute (repatriation, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, etc.), as provided for in point 32 of the Moroccan plan of 2007.
One central question remains: can Algeria and the separatist movement refuse the meetings and negotiations proposed by the Personal Envoy to the United States? Until now, these two actors, who had participated in two roundtables in Switzerland (in December 2018 and March 2019), had subsequently rejected this format. Today, new terms are being imposed upon them. In reality, there is no other option than to rejoin the UN process as enshrined in Resolution 2797 of October 31, 2025.
