LONDON – Never admit failure and never apologise. These seem to be the guiding principles of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

His

in a bid to kill some of the top leaders of the radical Palestinian organisation Hamas was met with widespread international condemnation, including a sharp rebuke just issued by a rare summit of 50 heads of state and government of Arab and Muslim states.

Unusually, the United States – Israel’s closest ally – also initially expressed displeasure, with US President Donald Trump complaining that he was

, giving the White House no opportunity to oppose it.

And perhaps more importantly, Mr Netanyahu’s risky gamble seems to have failed: Hamas claims

.

Yet, Mr Netanyahu is undeterred. He doubled down on threats to hit Qatar again, should he consider it necessary.

And he emerged triumphant from meetings

, who has just ended a visit to Israel. Instead of scolding the Israelis, America’s top diplomat avoided a public discussion about the bombing of Qatar and instead supported the Israeli position that only the “elimination” of Hamas can bring about an end to the Gaza war.

However, beyond his carefully cultivated macho image of defiance, the reality is that the Qatar attack has weakened Mr Netanyahu at home and isolated his country even further.

A week after the bombing, it is still difficult to separate facts from fiction. Still, peering through the fog of claims and counterclaims, it is evident that most of Israel’s security establishment was against the bombing of Qatar.

Of particular importance are growing indications that the operation was initially designed to be a ground attack, executed by Israeli special forces with the help of agents of Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency.

That would have meant a far more precise targeting of Hamas leaders, and would have given Israel the opportunity for some plausible deniability. Nothing would have been said publicly, and, at least in theory, the Qatari response might have been less forceful.

However, Mr David Barnea, the Mossad director, refused to participate for two key reasons. First, Israel’s intelligence agency has had good – if discreet – cooperation with Qatar in countering terrorism, and Mr Barnea was reluctant to destroy such links.

Second, Israel’s top spy continues to support diplomatic efforts to obtain the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas and end the Gaza war.

In November 2023, soon after the outbreak of the war, Mr Barnea joined hands with Mr William Burns, at the time the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, America’s foreign intelligence agency, in persuading Mr Netanyahu to rely on the mediation services of Qatar in obtaining the release of the hostages.

These efforts were partially successful, with almost half of the 250 Israeli hostages freed through various Qatar-mediated arrangements. So, the head of Israel’s intelligence service refused to end this productive relationship with Qatar by ordering his agents to stage an assassination attack on Qatari territory.

Mr Netanyahu could not override Mr Barnea’s objections. The current head of Mossad has earned a fearsome reputation within Israel.

It was essentially the intelligence he provided that led Israel’s June campaign of attacks against Iran’s nuclear weapons and decapitated Iran’s military command. Mr Barnea is not a man to be ignored.

So, Mr Netanyahu turned to his only other option: an air strike. That also required careful handling to minimise the political fallout.

The Hamas villa in Qatar was targeted by 12 Israeli fighter jets, which launched ballistic missiles while flying over the Red Sea. The missiles reached hundreds of kilometres above the earth’s surface as they crossed Saudi Arabia before reaching their target.

That meant the airspace of any neighbouring Arab state was not violated. It also meant that Israel had to use its newest air-launched ballistic missiles, dubbed “Golden Horizon” and “Rocks”, both domestically produced.

Minutes before the strikes, the Israelis informed the US of the operation, but apparently did not specify the target. Space-based US sensors quickly identified the launches of the Israeli missiles and calculated their trajectories. Yet by then it was too late to do anything.

Mr Netanyahu was correct in assuming that, although the incident would annoy Mr Trump, the US President’s anger would not be long-lasting. Mr Rubio has already indicated Washington is ready to forget its differences with Israel.

Yet on every other count, the Israeli leader was proven wrong.

While the targeted Hamas leaders have not been seen in public since the attack, that might be due to two reasons: They were either wounded and are now in hospital, or they were spirited out of Qatar. The probable explanation is a mixture of the two.

Still, this is clearly not the success Mr Netanyahu expected. The Israeli media is now full of unfavourable comments about the Prime Minister; the man who pretended to be a great strategist is now cut to size.

The bombing of Qatar will not result in the formal cut-off of Israel’s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, the two Gulf monarchies that have

. But the attack has prompted a new wave of Gulf Arab solidarity of a kind not experienced in decades.

And it has further dimmed the chance of any political accommodation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, once a cornerstone of Mr Netanyahu’s policies.

Mr Netanyahu claims that even if unsuccessful, the attack should serve as a warning to all Hamas leaders.

“We sent a message to the terrorists,” he said on Sept 15. “You can run, but you can’t hide, and we’ll get you.”

Some Israeli sources now speculate that Israel could also try to assassinate Hamas leaders elsewhere, even outside the Middle East, in places such as Turkey.

But that’s just bluster. Attacking targets in Turkey, a member state of Nato, the US alliance in Europe, is an entirely different proposition.

And, far from enlarging Israel’s room for manoeuvre, the attack on Qatar has forced the US to provide stronger military reassurances to the Gulf state. Mr Trump warned

, a threat even Mr Netanyahu won’t dare to put to the test.

Of course, by trying to kill the Hamas leaders, Mr Netanyahu has succeeded in killing off another plan to end the Gaza war.

But on almost every other count, he has only increased Israel’s strategic predicament and international isolation.

In short, a classic Netanyahu story.