Six days into the war between Israel and Iran, the most pressing question has become: Who holds the military initiative in this unprecedented conflict? Is Israeli air superiority still the primary decisive factor, or have Iranian missiles redrawn the balance of deterrence and perhaps even changed the rules of the game in the Middle East?
This debate is no longer theoretical. The divergent positions in the International Atomic Energy Agency's reports, the conflicting statements of its Director General, Rafael Grossi, and the successive field findings reveal that the war has entered a new phase of testing military proficiency and strategic resilience. At the heart of this test are the Natanz and Fordo facilities, Ben Gurion Airport, and Haifa facilities, as primary targets that expose the limits of each side's strength and weakness.
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In the major opening strike, Israel launched a massive air attack using more than 200 fighter jets, targeting nuclear and military facilities more than 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) deep inside Iranian territory. Following the American Beast Slap model, Tel Aviv aimed to completely paralyze Iran's capabilities within 48 hours.
However, the IAEA Director General's report to the Board of Governors on June 16 showed that key nuclear facilities, particularly Natanz and Fordow, were not destroyed. At Natanz, the upper portion of the test facility sustained damage, while the underground centrifuge halls, which house approximately 14,000 highly enriched centrifuges, remained intact, according to the official statement.
However, Grossi later, on the same day, said in an interview with the BBC that there was a strong possibility that all centrifuges had been completely destroyed, a blatant contradiction that raises major questions about the agency's impartiality, especially in light of Grossi's well-known political ambitions to succeed António Guterres as UN Secretary-General.
Most importantly, the strike failed to penetrate the deep underground fortifications, highlighting the limits of Israeli air power against highly fortified targets. Israel lacks the MOP GBU-57, a bunker-buster capable of penetrating more than 60 meters of reinforced concrete, a capability reserved for the US Air Force. The result: Israeli air power caused disruption, but did not achieve the desired paralysis.
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In contrast, the Iranian response came as part of Operation True Promise 3, which included the launch of more than 370 ballistic and cruise missiles over three consecutive nights. The surprise was not only the intensity, but also the ability of these missiles to penetrate Israel's advanced multi-layered defense systems (Arrow, David's Sling, and Iron Dome).
As of Tuesday morning, the reported death toll in Israel had reached 24, and extensive damage was inflicted on vital facilities in Tel Aviv, including Ben Gurion Airport and power plants, partially paralyzing air and civil traffic. This strike is the most extensive on Israeli territory since 1948.
Unlike aircraft, Iranian missiles do not require refueling or entry into hostile airspace. Thanks to underground storage technologies, radio control, and geographic distribution, Iran maintains its readiness to respond even when launch platforms are destroyed. Thus, missiles have become a strategic pressure tool par excellence, imposing a retaliatory response to every strike and affirming Iran's presence in the deterrence equation.
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The Israeli strike was based on surprise and technical superiority, but the Iranian response relied on impact and comprehensiveness. In modern warfare, precision is not enough; what matters is how you force the enemy to adjust its behavior and shift its strategies.
Israel has clear air superiority, but is constrained logistically and time-wise. In contrast, Iran is relying on a strategy of attrition through high-intensity missiles, and has thus far demonstrated its ability to disrupt Israeli air superiority and paralyze the home front.
Modern warfare is not decided by a single weapon. What the past few days have revealed is that missiles are no longer a secondary weapon, but rather a central element in the system of deterrence and control over the pace of escalation or de-escalation. Although the Grossi report did not explicitly state the failure of the Israeli strike, it did state:"The impact is limited, the damage above ground is sustained, and radiation is under control." In strategic language, this means: The target has not yet been hit.
