After more than a week of Israeli attacks against Iran, the United States has joined the offensive, striking three facilities linked to the Iranian nuclear project with high-powered weapons. The damage assessment will have to be carried out in the days and weeks to come. What is clear for now is the Trump administration's message: a message that seeks to balance the projection of force with the desire to prevent the US from becoming involved in a protracted conflict. The problem is that the message and the initial intention are one thing, and the series of scenarios now opening up for the region are quite another. Below are some preliminary notes.
(Note: This is a follow-up piece that only analyzes the context of the US attacks and some of the information we have at the time of writing regarding an extremely fluid situation. I have written several articles about the context and motivations for starting this war here.)
1. As we explained before, Trump had to navigate the pressure of two forces, both within his administration and within his own framework. On the one hand, the “America First” doctrine and all the actors that support it oppose US involvement in a new war in the Middle East, something that Trump himself has harshly criticized as a failed strategy in every sense. On the other hand, however, the “Peace Through Strength” doctrine maintains that the projection of power and the determination to use it are absolutely necessary to deter enemies and force them to negotiate on terms favorable to Washington. According to a significant segment of the Republican Party, the Pentagon, and Trump's own inner circle, if the president had given Iran a 60-day deadline to reach a nuclear deal and halt uranium enrichment, and Tehran had not complied, then Washington should demonstrate its willingness to use force, even at the cost.
2. Such a message is not only for Iran or other actors in the region, but for all kinds of adversaries, rivals, or even allies of Trump who have now spread the TACO theory (“Trump always chickens out”). For a president who bases most of his strategies on tough negotiating positions—military, commercial, political, and diplomatic, inside and outside the US—it is essential to show himself as a president who complies and is willing to pay the costs of compliance.
3. However, and considering both his base and the US electorate—between 6 and 7 in 10 Americans opposed the attack on Iran— what Trump and his entire administration are communicating at the time of this writing is that this is a single operation. “The planes are already returning home,” Trump wrote. Home. Not to nearby bases. Vice President Vance assured that “there will be no troops on the ground.” This is not an invasion like those in Afghanistan or Iraq, they have declared, but rather an operation of powerful force, but one that is already over, and it is up to Iran to negotiate and end it at this point.
4. While this is his most powerful operation, this same formula has been repeated by Trump in the past, for example, on the two occasions he attacked Assad in Syria, or when he ordered the assassination of General Soleimani, then the second most powerful man in Iran. Trump's tendency is usually to YES attack, YES follow through on his threats, but immediately look for a way out to avoid further involvement, or negotiate terms that he can present as appropriate. If we observe his behavior, something similar happens in his tariff wars. On the military front, a few weeks ago we were able to observe him with his campaign against the Houthis. On that occasion, the campaign was lasting several weeks, much longer than he would have liked, and he rushed to agree to a ceasefire with that Yemeni group, even though it did not include Israel.
5. However, we are facing a much more complex environment and, therefore, beyond the intentions of Trump and his team, a series of additional variables must be introduced into this equation. We will try to discuss some of them.
A. First, the war between Israel and Iran is not over, and its development could take very different directions. In this confrontation, Iran's strategy—very much in the style of asymmetric combat—is precisely to prolong hostilities, seeking to psychologically exhaust the Israeli population, exert political pressure on it, and generate economic impacts that force Israel to pay the costs for its attacks. Therefore, what happens in this regard in the coming days and weeks remains to be seen.
B. Second, Iran has an arsenal of tactics, also asymmetric, to strike at US interests in the region, which includes attacking US bases, ships, and aircraft, to disrupting trade and navigation in the region. Iran could attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world's oil circulates; it could harass vessels in the Persian Gulf; or, with the help of its Houthi allies, it could do the same to those traveling through the Red Sea from Asia to Europe. Iran could attack oil facilities in the region, generating high costs for the global economy. It could also seek to attack so-called soft targets, which include civilian facilities where there are diplomats or US or Israeli citizens, which is not limited to the Middle East. For these types of tactics, Tehran continues to count on a damaged, but still vibrant, circle of alliances that stretch from Lebanon to Yemen, through Iraq and other parts of the region.
C. Third, Iran may decide that, given the current circumstances, it has no alternative but to move toward arming a nuclear bomb. At this point, of course, it will be necessary to assess the damage inflicted by the United States to Iran's nuclear facilities, which is in addition to that already inflicted by Israel. According to estimates, before the U.S. bombings, Israel had managed to delay Iran's nuclear project by a few months, perhaps up to a year, but no more. It is likely that the U.S. attacks have delayed it even further, perhaps even by several years. However, it is worth considering that (a) Iran probably retains about 400 kg of uranium already enriched to 60%, material that it could use in the future for its nuclear purposes; (b) Iran still has the technical know-how necessary, if it so chooses, to eventually arm the bomb; and (c) we do not know whether the damage caused is irreversible, or whether there are other ways—or even other facilities—through which Iran could continue advancing toward that goal, even if it takes longer. It is true that attacks against it could resume at any time. However, as has happened in the past, history shows that if the objective exists and the knowledge is available, a country can eventually achieve those goals if it chooses to do so. 6. Therefore, it is essential to observe what is happening with and within the Iranian leadership. Washington has been very clear that its goal is not"regime change" and that it would not support Israel if that were its goal. That is why a combination of factors needs to be introduced here as well:
A. The Iranian leadership is undoubtedly in shock and deeply shaken. Israel has eliminated key figures in the regime, and it has taken them enormous effort to recover from this series of shocks. However, the structures of the system remain in place. The collaboration between the elite ayatollahs, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, and the entire political and economic machinery they control is very difficult to break. There is no unified, organized opposition that represents a solid challenge at this point, and if this were to change in the coming months, the country would enter uncharted territory, not necessarily the emergence of a regime more akin to the West.
B. Within this complex system, there are undoubtedly important voices that favor negotiation. What Trump is offering is precisely the survival of the regime. From that perspective, we should accept the losses, move forward, and rethink strategies to pursue national interests. These voices can now play a role that should not be immediately dismissed, especially if hostilities continue and if the tactics employed by Tehran are not effective in responding to the attacks it receives.
C. However, there is a very large sector that is completely disappointed that negotiations were ever given a chance, that believes they were merely a US ploy to buy time, and that the current situation leaves Iran no alternative but to pursue the Chaos Doctrine. From this perspective, Iran must go all out against US, Israeli, and Western interests in general, and produce the greatest possible disruption using tactics such as those I have outlined above, among others.
D. There is also the potential collaboration with Tehran of other US adversaries. Specifically speaking of Russia and China, however, the reality is that they are not strictly allies of Iran. Indeed, in recent years they have coordinated certain policies with that country. Tehran has even supplied drones and missiles to Russia for its war in Ukraine, and Moscow collaborates on Iran's nuclear project. China has a robust 25-year cooperation agreement with Tehran. But even so, beyond diplomatic condemnations, the likelihood of any power joining militarily to defend Iran is extremely low. Tehran has allies, but they are not state actors.
E. Given all of the above, what will have to be weighed are the new decisions Trump makes in the face of possible Iranian retaliation and subsequent developments. That is to say, although his initial intuition and decision were to limit current actions to"a single operation," to the extent that its bases or interests are attacked, Washington will be forced to remain involved, which could extend the conflict much longer than Trump would have desired. This would undoubtedly have domestic political repercussions and pressure him to avoid further involvement, but it is uncertain to what extent he will actually be able to achieve this.
The likelihood is that this matter is far from over. But in the coming days, we'll be seeing how the factors I've mentioned combine. We'll have to monitor these developments and the potential repercussions of this war, which has now escalated to a historic degree. We'll continue writing about it.
