While the Israeli government has approved a plan to occupy all of Gaza, proposals for a"day after" plan, meaning a plan for after the war ends, continue to be discussed. In February of this year, Israeli opposition leader and former Prime Minister Yair Lapid visited Washington to meet with US administration officials. During this meeting, he presented a plan to resolve the Gaza crisis.
According to this plan, Egypt would administer the Gaza Strip without occupying it, in exchange for forgiveness of its debts amounting to approximately $153 billion. According to the plan, Egypt's administration of the Gaza Strip would last for 15 years, subject to renewal. Egypt would command a regional peacekeeping force composed of Egyptian and Arab forces. The force would have three main missions: the first would be to disarm Hamas and other armed groups, such as Islamic Jihad; the second would be to rebuild the Gaza Strip; and the third would be to provide security on the borders between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, and between the Gaza Strip and Israel. Israeli forces would be deployed along the Gaza Strip's borders, while an Egyptian-American-Israeli security mechanism would be responsible for preventing threats the Strip might pose to Israel's security, including halting arms smuggling and destroying tunnels, until the Palestinian Authority was able to govern Gaza. Egypt rejected the plan at the time, asserting that responsibility for peace must be international and that it was prepared to participate in reconstruction efforts, but refused to govern the Gaza Strip.
• • •
The proposal was repeated once again, this time by diplomat, writer, and academic Ezzedine Fishere, who wrote an important article in the Washington Post titled: This Country Should Take Over Gaza – For Now, which can be translated as: This country should control the Gaza Strip – for now. Fishere’s article contains more details than the proposal presented by Lapid, and of course, it is not possible to translate the entire proposal here, but the most important part it contained (in my estimation) is the following: First: That Egypt’s control over the Strip be within the framework of guardianship, not occupation.
Second: Work on two agreements. The first is a tripartite agreement between Egypt, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority. It includes Egypt's management of the Gaza Strip on the security, military, and bureaucratic levels. It also includes Hamas's surrender of its weapons, the registration of all its members with Egyptian authorities, the handover of all Israeli hostages, and the training of Palestinian Authority cadres capable of governing in the future. The second is a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel. It includes Israel's military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, coordination on border duties between the Gaza Strip and Israel, and the elimination of any threats to Israel emanating from the Gaza Strip.
Third: The task of reconstructing the Gaza Strip should be undertaken by international powers (the United States, the European Union, and other Arab countries). These countries should do more than just rebuild, so that the Gaza Strip can be economically revived by attracting international investments and building a land and seaport.
Fourth: The commercial, economic, and financial ties between the Gaza Strip and Israel must be severed, as it is impossible to restore them to their former state. The city of Arish must be transformed into a temporary commercial and financial center for Gaza until its reconstruction is complete, while stimulating the Egyptian economy by canceling or reducing its international debts.
• • •
Before commenting on this proposal, two points must be clarified: First, the similarity of the proposals between Lapid and Fisher does not necessarily mean any coordination. Fisher's proposal is more detailed, on the one hand, and, in general, this proposal has been proposed for a long time by more than one party, including parties previously affiliated with the Palestinian Authority, on the other. The second point is that one of the problems with Arab culture in dealing with unusual proposals is attacking individuals rather than engaging with the content. This usually ends with foolish accusations without evidence. More importantly, this cannot build any discussion or develop any proposal; rather, it is a reckless, deconstructive approach. Therefore, the next few lines deal with the proposal as its content, not with the personality or integrity of its author.
First: Although I reject the entire proposal, this does not mean that all of its components are unacceptable. Fisher has managed to formulate a proposal that transcends generalities and focuses on the conditions on the ground with extreme pragmatism, a position I agree with. The Palestinian cause can no longer tolerate empty slogans from a bygone era that have no bearing on the current regional situation and balance of power.
Second, to be more specific, the proposal to sever trade and economic ties between the Gaza Strip and Israel, Egypt's mediation to coordinate with Israel regarding the latter's military withdrawal from the Strip and the return of all prisoners, living and dead, Egypt's training of Palestinian cadres to govern the Strip, and Egypt's contribution to reconstruction efforts while easing the burden of debt are all acceptable. This is because it includes resolving outstanding issues since October 7, and even before that date, and because it will put an end to the suffering of Palestinians in the Strip.
Third: Regarding the proposals to dissolve Hamas and hand over its weapons, this is, in my opinion, imperative to end Israel's occupation of the Strip and to end the human tragedy in Gaza. Hamas must accept a clear reality: it is true that it dealt painful blows to Israel that the latter could not have imagined even in its worst nightmares. However, by all human, geographical, and military standards, the movement was defeated. The results of October 7th shattered Hamas's hopes of liberating all of Palestine and were a curse on the Strip, which was occupied and destroyed, and whose inhabitants were subjected to mass massacres and a famine that continues to strike.
Fourth: While I agree with all the aforementioned elements of the proposal, my rejection of the entire proposal stems from two specific points: First, my absolute refusal to have Egypt control the Gaza Strip, both security-wise and administratively; and second, my absolute refusal to have Egypt be responsible for disarming Hamas and registering all its members with Egyptian security agencies.
1. Egypt's control of the Gaza Strip administratively and security-wise would be a trap it would never escape and would threaten our national security. In such a devastated Gaza Strip, and with a people in such a nightmarish psychological state, having one state assume security responsibilities would be a landmine that would explode in the faces of Egyptians at any moment. At that point, the tragedy would not be limited to Gaza, but would extend to the Sinai Peninsula. 2. Hamas handing over its weapons to Egypt is another landmine that would explode in the faces of Egyptians, due to the well-known historical sensitivities between the Egyptian regime and the movement in particular, and Islamist groups in general, and due to the deliberate confusion between the narrative of resistance and the narrative of terrorism globally before regionally. Furthermore, Egypt cannot, under any circumstances, guarantee that Hamas's weapons have been fully surrendered, and therefore any future use of the weapon would be Egypt's responsibility, at which point we would be besieged globally and held legally and morally responsible for the use of this weapon. 3. What is not mentioned in this proposal is the Gaza tunnels; Even if we assume that Hamas agrees to hand over its weapons to the Egyptians, will Egypt's mission also include destroying all these tunnels? If Israel and the United States, with all their advanced military technology, are thus far unable to destroy or map the tunnels, amid estimates that the tunnels may actually encompass an entire city, or perhaps two underground cities, will Egypt be able to contain them, let alone destroy them? 4. Egypt's administrative and security control over the Gaza Strip, along with the transformation of El-Arish into a commercial and financial center to support the Strip, necessarily means exporting the refugee and displacement issues to Egypt. The latter plan is no longer a secret; the ruling Israeli right has expressed it more than once, and we know—and they know—the consequences of this plan and its impact on us. 5. When speaking of pragmatism, we cannot separate the historical context from the present. Historically, Egypt's rule of the Gaza Strip, by proxy through the General Palestine Council (1949-1959), and directly administratively, security-wise, and politically (1959-1967), was one of the most important historical reasons for demonizing the Egyptian role in Gaza. The Gaza revolt in March 1955 against the Egyptian presence, amidst rumors spreading about the displacement of Palestinians to Egypt, is just one example of the many historical consequences of this bitter experience and the turmoil and insinuations that Egypt has been subjected to - and continues to be subjected to. To lure Egypt into reducing its debts or even canceling them entirely would be a small price to pay for threatening our national security and enabling Israel to export its legal, moral, security, and historical responsibilities to Egypt. This is a trap that Egypt must never accept falling into.
