The future trajectory of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations

Abdul Basit Khan

November 30, 2025 19:17

Despite three rounds of negotiations in Qatar and Turkiye, Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions over Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) presence and the use of Afghan soil for cross-border terrorism have not subsided. Though a tenuous ceasefire reached in Doha holds, both sides have not agreed on a mechanism to tackle TTP’s challenge. The third round of talks in Istanbul ended in a stalemate and Turkish mediators are likely to visit Afghanistan and Pakistan soon to break the deadlock. The elephant in the room is TTP’s presence in Afghanistan and without addressing it the relationship is unlikely to improve.

Pakistan has kept all major border crossings with Afghanistan closed for trade and people’s movement. The expulsion of Afghan refugees from Pakistan has also been expedited to build pressure on Kabul.

In response, the Taliban regime has urged Afghan traders to explore alternative trade routes to minimize their dependence on Pakistan. Already, the import of medicines and other pharmaceutical products from Pakistan has been banned. Furthermore, the Taliban regime has given Afghan traders three months to find alternative options for wheat import. The Taliban are indicating that they will do trade through Iran and Central Asia. The posturing from both sides clearly indicates that they will not budge from their hardened positions and tensions will persist for the foreseeable future.

In April, Pakistan reached out to the Taliban regime through Chinese mediation to resolve security issues diplomatically. In the same month, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Kabul, a first major trip by a Pakistani official since February 2023. His trip rekindled the hope that after a year of hostilities ties might move in a more positive direction. This was the last-ditch diplomatic effort by Pakistan to convince Kabul about its security concerns.

Following Dar’s visit, the Taliban issued a religious directive barring its individuals from participating in fights outside Afghanistan, with little success. The high-profile militant attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also subsided during this period. However, the situation took a negative turn in June when a Pakistan Army convoy was attacked with an explosive-laden car in North Waziristan, leaving 13 soldiers dead. The attack revived the blame game between Kabul and Islamabad. Pakistan’s effort to forge a broad-based relationship with the Taliban regime involving trade, regional connectivity projects and energy instead of a security-centric approach failed to change the Taliban’s strategic calculus.

In this deadlock, the common people are suffering not only the consequences of cross-border militancy but indefinite border closure and the suspension of trade as well. 

Abdul Basit Khan

The Taliban’s inaction against TTP is rooted in a longstanding ideological, political, ethnic and battlefield camaraderie with the group. TTP has pledged its oath of allegiance to the Taliban’s Emir Haibatullah Akhundzada. TTP imitates the Taliban’s insurgency framework in Pakistan with self-declared provinces, shadow ministries and military zones. It overhauls its organizational structure and reshuffles leadership positions every year to cope with the evolving operational environment and counterterrorism challenges. To dispel the impression of its presence in Afghanistan, following Pakistan’s airstrikes in Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan, TTP ran a series of videos showing its presence in Pakistan. At the same time, it stopped claiming attacks through its official propaganda arm, Umar Media, to relieve pressure from the Taliban.

Pakistan views the Taliban regime as an ideological and strategic enabler of TTP. On the contrary, the Taliban term TTP as Pakistan’s internal matter.

In a bold move, Pakistan targeted a vehicle carrying TTP leaders in Kabul while near-simultaneously striking militant camps in Kandahar, Jalalabad, Khost and Paktika. In retaliation, the Taliban targeted Pakistani check posts with mortar fire along the entire stretch of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, marking the highest level of tensions between the two sides since the Taliban’s return to power.

In the past, Pakistan has reminded the Taliban regime of its counterterrorism obligations under the framework of the Doha Agreement 2020. However, the Taliban have maintained that legally Pakistan is not a party to the Doha Agreement. This is the main reason why Pakistan has insisted during Doha and Istanbul talks, to come up with a written security agreement.

Under a revised approach, Pakistan has made apparent that cross-border militancy will lead to an immediate response. The future trajectory of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations will largely depend on their ability to address TTP’s challenge.

Any instability emanating from enduring Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions will benefit transnational militant groups like Al-Qaeda and Daesh-Khorasan and regional peace spoilers.

Both Kabul and Islamabad would do well to dispassionately revisit their current hostile postures to find a workable solution. Pakistan’s strikes in Afghanistan will deepen the Taliban-TTP nexus instead of forcing a rethink in the former’s ideological outlook. At the same time, the Taliban’s denial of TTP’s presence in the face of undeniable evidence is not going to cut any ice with Pakistan’s security institutions. In this deadlock, the common people are suffering not only the consequences of cross-border militancy but indefinite border closure and the suspension of trade as well.