Rio de Janeiro has become the scene of an urban war. A massive police operation against the Comando Vermelho (CV), the city's most powerful drug faction, left more than 130 dead, making it the deadliest raid in Rio's history. The episode reveals the complex network of criminal organizations operating in Rio: on one side, the drug trafficking gangs, led by the CV and those that emerged from its splinter groups; on the other, the paramilitary militias formed by former police officers and other agents who control large outlying areas.
The Comando Vermelho (Red Command) was born in the late 1970s when common criminals and left-wing activists shared the Ilha Grande prison during the Brazilian dictatorship. From this alliance emerged in 1979 the group known as Falange Vermelha, which the press later called CV. Under the motto"Peace, Justice, and Freedom," its founders adopted a structure of collective discipline, learned in prison, to organize and expand beyond the prison walls. In the early 1980s, several of these leaders left prison and transformed the organization into a powerful criminal structure in the marginalized favelas of Rio de Janeiro, focusing on drug trafficking.
By 1990, Comando Vermelho already dominated the drug trade in Rio: according to journalistic investigations, 90% of the city's favelas were under its control. The faction recruits young people from impoverished communities who, in the absence of the state, see crime as an economic alternative. These"soldiers," many 20 years old or younger, manage the drug sales points while the historical kingpins—like Fernandinho Beira-Mar—continue to issue orders from prison. CV maintains an almost military-style internal code and clandestine courts: betrayal can cost you your life, and theft within the favela can result in mutilation.
The power of the Comando Vermelho
Rio's security forces describe the CV as the most violent group: its hitmen fight operations "with fire and blood," using assault rifles and grenades, and have even attacked the police with extreme cruelty. Clashes lasting up to eight hours continue to occur in the favelas. This level of violence has led authorities to equate it with a"narco-terrorist" organization in their recent official rhetoric.
Even though many of its leaders have been arrested or killed, Comando Vermelho has remained resilient. According to an academic study by the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), between 2022 and 2023, the CV expanded its controlled areas by 8.4%, reaching 51.9% of the territory dominated by criminal groups in the Rio metropolitan area. This expansion restored the primacy it had lost to militias years earlier. In addition to its local dominance, the CV operates in at least ten Brazilian states and has allied itself with other factions—for example, Família do Norte—to control drug trafficking routes on the Amazonian borders. After almost half a century, it remains synonymous with criminal power in Rio.
Rival factions exist, but their power is fluctuating and fragmented. The Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) was formed in 1998 after the expulsion of a CV member accused of ordering an internal assassination. Since then, it has controlled drug sales points in the northern and western zones of the city, including Rocinha, Rio's most populous favela. The Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) emerged in 2002 after a split from the former Terceiro Comando, led by Nei da Conceição Facão. It operates mainly in the North Zone and in the outskirts of other states. None of these factions has been able to dethrone the CV: their presence is smaller, although they remain important players in certain territories.
Paramilitary militias emerged as a distinct but equally powerful actor. Composed of former police officers, former military personnel, and active or retired security agents, these militias do not present themselves to the public as mere criminal gangs. Since the 2000s, they have proclaimed themselves “community self-defense groups.” Some analysts trace their roots to the “death squads” of the 1960s and 70s, formed by police officers linked to state repression.
The initial justification was to liberate communities from drug cartel control. For a time, they expelled traffickers and reduced certain crimes, which earned them the support of residents and local politicians. In 2006, then-mayor César Maia referred to them as “community self-defense groups” that brought peace to neighborhoods previously dominated by crime. That same year, current mayor Eduardo Paes acknowledged that the “policia mineira”—the nickname for the militias—had restored security to areas like Jacarepaguá. Political collusion facilitated their consolidation.
But beneath this facade of order, the militias have become lucrative and violent mafias. Today they rule through terror, intimidation, and the systematic collection of fees: they impose payments for water, bottled gas, informal transportation, and the sale of illegal land. One particularly profitable business is"gatonet": pirate TV and internet service that they control with illegal decoders, preventing residents from subscribing to legitimate providers. Millions of Brazilians consume these services. They also engage in usurious lending, extortion of businesses, and, in recent years, drug trafficking.
By 2020-21, the militias controlled approximately 57.5% of Rio's urban territory and managed at least 37 official neighborhoods and 165 favelas. By 2018, more than two million Rio residents lived under their control, especially in the West Zone and the Baixada Fluminense. This expansion made the militias the main antagonist of the Comando Vermelho for control of Rio.
Life under the control of the militias is characterized by fear and insidious violence. There are accounts of people being brutally punished for buying from unauthorized stores or failing to make payments. Punishments range from public beatings to murder and disappearances. In some cases, bodies are dumped in rivers with stones tied to them. Statistics show that anonymous reports of abuse by militia members even surpass those filed against drug traffickers in the state. The modus operandi is based on an apparent calm sustained by enforced silence: there are no frequent shootouts like in the narco-favelas, but fear is constant.
One of the key elements of the militia phenomenon is its network of connections with the state. Current or former security agents create corruption networks that supply them with weapons, ammunition, and protection in exchange for bribes. In 2008, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro revealed that its final report requested the prosecution of 266 individuals, including seven politicians accused of collaborating with militia groups. Several paramilitary leaders became elected officials or figures close to them, which made it difficult to eradicate their influence.
The reality of Rio de Janeiro today is that of a city fragmented into fiefdoms. Generally speaking, drug cartels dominate most of the favelas in the North Zone and some in the South Zone, while militias prevail in the West Zone and the metropolitan suburbs. Recent data indicate that, following the latest conquests of the CV (Civilian Combat Police), areas under the influence of drug traffickers have once again surpassed those controlled by militias: approximately 52% of the territory controlled by criminals is in the hands of drug cartels and about 48% by militias, according to the UFF (United Front of Rio de Janeiro) mapping. In terms of population, it is estimated that some 2 million inhabitants are under the control of drug cartels and 1.7 million under the control of militias.
The interaction between these actors is dynamic and violent. In western neighborhoods like Gardenia Azul, Rio das Pedras, Barra da Tijuca, and Cidade de Deus, CV offensives to retake territory have been documented.Many of these incursions intensified after militia leaders were arrested or killed following 2018, creating vacuums that the CV exploited. A telling example is Gardenia Azul: when former councilman Cristiano Girão was arrested for ordering a murder, the community endured months of constant gunfire.
A prime example is the assassination of councilwoman Marielle Franco and her driver Anderson Gomes on March 14, 2018, investigated as a political execution involving actors linked to militias. In March 2024, the Brazilian Federal Police arrested Chiquinho Brazão and his brother, Domingos Brazão, both with a history of ties to paramilitary militias in Rio de Janeiro, as the alleged masterminds behind the crime. One of the accused perpetrators, former military police officer Ronnie Lessa, was identified as a militia leader in the city's west zone prior to the assassination.
From the drug trafficking perspective, Comando Vermelho maintains an almost imperialistic policy of expansion. “For CV, conquering new territories is a matter of honor and glory; it’s important for its reputation,” explains researcher Carolina Grillo. Unlike other more hierarchical organizations such as the PCC in São Paulo, CV operates in a decentralized manner: each favela wages its own war, each “dono do morro” (local boss) seeks to expand. This means that multiple fronts of combat can be active simultaneously in the city without centralized coordination.
Amid this criminal landscape, the public security forces—Rio de Janeiro's Military Police, the Civil Police, and occasionally the Armed Forces—act as a fourth actor, intervening with targeted operations but never managing to permanently occupy all territories. The authorities wage a two-pronged battle—against drug cartels in some areas and against militias in others—but their effectiveness is undermined by internal corruption. There have been numerous reports of officers collaborating with one side or the other: selling weapons, providing information, and allowing crime and the state to coexist. This ambiguity blurs the line between law and crime, while millions of Rio residents continue to live in territories where the state's presence is limited to lethal raids.
