LONDON – As measured by the size of the combined population of its member states, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is the world’s largest regional organisation. And the current Tianjin summit is SCO’s largest since its inception a quarter of a century ago.

So, at least in theory, the gathering of the SCO – which has 10 member states – should have attracted a great deal of attention in Europe, home to another regional organisation with claims to global relevance.

In reality, however, few European officials and even fewer European media outlets are paying much attention to the summit. Instead, all European eyes are directed at the interaction between three leaders at the gathering: Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Everything else happening in Tianjin on Aug 31 and Sept 1 is dismissed in European capitals as just diplomatic noise.

In 2001, the SCO was founded by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Back then, the view in Europe was that the organisation’s primary purpose was to manage the competition between Russia and China over influence in Central Asia and that, as a result, it was of little global interest.

That perception soon changed in the wake of the Sept 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent US military intervention in Afghanistan. Both the US and Nato, the US-led military alliance in Europe, relied on Central Asian nations for their help with bases and logistical supply lines.

The SCO’s growing significance pleased Russia, which suddenly realised that an organisation, which even the Russians did not take too seriously at its inception, had the potential to provide Moscow with added leverage.

President Putin was uncharacteristically candid on this point. Speaking in September 2006 to the so-called Valdai Forum, a yearly get-together of his country’s top policymakers, the Russian leader explained: “We did not plan the SCO to be so prominent – it was established to address trivial matters such as border demarcations. But then, it started to develop, and there is now a real demand (for a strong SCO), which is why others want to join.”

The peak of European interest in the SCO came in 2008, when it became clear that the US wanted to extricate itself from Afghanistan, and the Europeans started to fret about who would provide security in swathes of Central Asia and the Middle East – fertile grounds for future terrorist networks.

The SCO’s decision to establish a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure – which went by the unfortunate acronym Rats and operated from a base in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan – seemed to address Europe’s concerns.

Furthermore, Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia provided the Europeans with an early warning that they may need to diversify away from their dependence on Russia for supplies of oil and natural gas.

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with their significant oil and gas outputs, were clearly prime candidates for this diversification. Both were actively discussing the creation of new “energy corridors” under the SCO umbrella.

Germany, which held the rotating presidency of the European Union in 2008, even suggested formalising the EU’s links with the SCO.

And the efforts of that time are now more than just history; Mr Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the former German foreign minister who showed the greatest interest in forging links with the SCO, is currently Germany’s President.

Still, most of these efforts came to nothing, largely because the confrontation between Russia and the West intensified, and the SCO came to be seen as just another anti-Western platform.

The SCO’s 2010 decision to start admitting new members confirmed this perception: Apart from Russia, the only other European full member of the SCO is Belarus, dismissed in all European capitals as merely a sad parody of Russia.

The perception in Europe is that China and Russia’s attempts to transform the SCO into an alternative to what they perceive as Western-dominated global institutions have failed, and that its growing size is now the SCO’s primary challenge.

The organisation did nothing when India and Pakistan – two of its members – came to blows in May. The SCO did condemn the Israeli and US attacks on Iran in June, but India officially distanced itself from this position.

And when Armenia and Azerbaijan – two SCO “dialogue partners” who have been at loggerheads for decades – finally agreed to settle their disputes in August, this was because of US mediation.

The truth remains that no member state thinks of the SCO as a useful mechanism for resolving any dispute.

Still, European security specialists will be closely watching several potential developments in Tianjin.

One topic of interest is the activities of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Britain, France and Germany are warning that unless Iran provides clear explanations about the extent of its nuclear programme and allows international inspectors to visit its atomic installations, fresh and crippling economic sanctions will be imposed on the country by October.

European capitals are eager to see whether President Pezeshkian will receive the full backing of Russia and China in his refusal to bow to such threats. There is also considerable interest in any sign that Iran is about to purchase Russian or Chinese weapons to repair its air defences, badly damaged by the Israeli strikes.

However, what preoccupies European leaders most is any sign of closer cooperation between India, China and Russia in standing up to

particularly his decision to impose punitive tariffs on India for its purchases of Russian oil.

The Europeans fully expect Indian Prime Minister Modi to remain defiant in his rejection of US pressure. It also seems inevitable that the SCO will agree to condemn Mr Trump’s broader use of tariffs.

But anything that goes beyond that – particularly any indication that China and India are contemplating closer cooperation to defy Western economic sanctions on Russia – will be treated as a blow to Europe’s interests.

Seeking to prevent this, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had a lengthy phone conversation with Mr Modi on Aug 30.

“The leaders coordinated their positions ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit,” a statement issued by the Ukrainian government claimed.

Ukraine’s official optimism is not shared in other European capitals. Still, most European governments agree that if India gets closer to China, and even closer to Russia in Tianjin, that won’t be because of the SCO as such, but due to the policies of the man in the White House.