That's what it's about

• The Coalition of the Willing met in Paris on Wednesday.
• They want to secure peace in post-war Ukraine by sending their own troops and providing further security guarantees.
• Ulrich Schmid of the University of St. Gallen explains why some countries are either open or hesitant about the venture.
• He believes that Switzerland could also play a role in the post-war period, as it did in Kosovo.

What happens once the war in Ukraine ends and peace must be maintained? In Paris, the Coalition of the Willing wants to give the attacked country concrete security guarantees for the post-war period. This involves supporting the Ukrainian army, and only secondarily the crucial issue: the deployment of its own troops, which will in turn be backed by the United States.

But no pressure, says the Élysée Palace. Everyone should contribute to security guarantees according to their ability – not necessarily by sending troops. Berlin has considerable reservations on the issue anyway. A ceasefire must first be achieved in Ukraine, anyway.

How realistic is the deployment of Western troops? Who is for and against it and why? What role, if any, will Switzerland play in the postwar period? Questions for Ulrich Schmid, Professor of Eastern European Studies at the University of St. Gallen.

Mr. Schmid, what do you say about the biggest challenge of the meeting?

The idea behind the deployment of Western soldiers is to place a kind of UN peacekeeping force between the two warring parties. This peacekeeping force is intended to act as a security barrier and monitor the cessation of arms fire.

Can this work?

There are two main problems: Russia views all foreign troops in Ukraine as an enemy that can be attacked. And the idea of sending its own soldiers is highly controversial in individual European states. At the moment, it looks as if France and Great Britain would be willing to do so after a possible peace or ceasefire, while Germany and Poland are offering much more cautious signals.

Why France and Great Britain?

As former empires, both countries have experience with military presence abroad. Great Britain is also among the most critical countries toward Russia – a key event was the polonium poisoning of Russian defector Litvinenko in London in 2006. France, in turn, sees Brexit as an opportunity to assume a leadership role in Europe. Macron often emphasizes that France is now the only nuclear power in the EU. He pursues the vision of an independent European defense with strong French leadership. By emphasizing foreign and Ukraine policy, however, he also distracts from countless problems at home.

Is the German and Polish reluctance also a historical development?

Certainly in Germany. Here, a post-heroic society exists, and people are generally reluctant to engage in military operations. It's different in Poland, which recently halted arms deliveries to its neighbor—not out of a lack of support for Ukraine, but out of fear of protecting its own defense capabilities. The sense of threat is strong; people want to protect their own resources.

Does Switzerland appear in the discussion about the post-war period?

Full-fledged Swiss military participation in a Western troop deployment in Ukraine is, of course, out of the question. However, after the peace agreement, Switzerland could play a similar role as it did in the past in Kosovo. Back then, it showed genuine solidarity with the international community, pulling together. Even now, Switzerland, as a very wealthy country that has so far shown only moderate support for Ukraine, could make a real contribution to a long-term solution.