The foreign policy of the Orbán regime over the past fifteen years has been characterized by a tense, bad, and increasingly hostile relationship with the European Union – more precisely, with the European Commission, the majority of the European Parliament. The situation has now escalated to the point where the European Union is holding back roughly half of the cohesion funds and the recovery fund, and Hungary is being fined one million euros a day for not implementing a European Union court ruling on asylum. As early as the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Viktor Orbán saw – as Prime Minister, he spoke about this on several occasions after 2010 – that the West was in decline and that we could see the rise of Eastern powers (especially China), and that Hungary therefore needed to strengthen its economic and political relations with Asian countries, including Russia and even the states of the Turkic Council.

It is clear that the tense relationship with the European Union also contributed to Hungarian foreign policy choosing the policy of “opening to the East” in order to avoid the cold relations with the West and international isolation, or as Prime Minister Balázs Orbán’s director put it, following the foreign policy of “connectivity”. Accordingly, despite all external and internal criticism, the Orbán governments have continuously done business with Russia, China and the countries of the Turkic Council.

During the Obama and Biden administrations, the US and the West represented a line that strongly opposed Orbán's foreign policy and the Hungarian representation of illiberalism. It was necessary to wait until about halfway through the first Trump administration before Viktor Orbán was invited to the White House in 2019, but from then on, the US government's criticism of the Hungarian Prime Minister's exercise of power ceased. With the Biden administration (2020–2024), the old order was restored, and the critical words were followed by actions: in addition to the visa restrictions, the Hungarian side was particularly adversely affected by the US termination of the US-Hungarian double taxation agreement. It is understandable that Budapest was greeted with great relief that it was not Democrat Kamala Harris, who wanted to basically continue Biden's foreign policy, but Donald Trump who became President of the United States.

Domestic use of the Trump-Orbán summit: defending the cost reduction

Putting aside all diplomatic subtleties and previous practices, Viktor Orbán openly supported the opposition Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, during Joe Biden's presidency. We know from him that figures close to the Hungarian government even helped develop Trump's election program, and the prime minister visited him at his home in Mar-a-Lago last year. After Trump's inauguration on January 20, the US government's criticism of Hungary's domestic political situation immediately ceased.

The tone on the American side became significantly friendlier, the visa restrictions were lifted, but at the same time, they kept harping on the fact that Hungary still buys large quantities of Russian oil and gas. Yet, when the meeting between US President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took place on November 7, it was clear in the public part of the meeting that there was a friendly, allied relationship between the two politicians. To emphasize this, the head of the Hungarian government was seated between the US president and vice president, emphasizing that they respect Orbán and consider him one of their own, and thus he was able to answer the questions of the journalists behind the Hungarian delegation from the same position opposite the US president.

However, after the negotiations, the agreements were no longer announced together, but were presented by the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó. To truly assess the negotiations correctly – and this is true for all other high-level international meetings – we should be familiar with the preparatory materials and the content of the closed-door discussions (such as the talks between Marco Rubio and Péter Szijjártó), the textual result of yesterday's agreements, their legal form and any confidential agreements.

The justification for caution and moderation is clearly demonstrated by the fact that while the Hungarian Prime Minister was still talking on Friday evening Hungarian time that Donald Trump had granted a full and unlimited exemption for the transactions of the southern gas pipeline supplying Hungary and the oil pipeline coming from the east, by Saturday morning Western news agencies (including the BBC and Bloomberg) were already reporting that the exemption was only valid for one year.

It is also important to note that before the hearing, ten US senators (both Democrats and Republicans) spoke out against Hungary continuing to buy Russian energy. And although the president has great power in the US, the legislature is so strong that it is very difficult to pursue successful presidential policies against it.

But it seems certain that the American side did not want to put the Hungarian side in a situation where the purchase of oil and gas would become significantly more expensive until the parliamentary elections due in April 2026, so it agreed to Hungary being exempted from American sanctions.

(As a reminder, the United States announced sanctions targeting Russia's two largest oil companies in October.)

The Hungarian Prime Minister struck a dramatic tone before his meeting with Trump, projecting the nightmare scenario that if he is not successful, the utility costs of the Hungarian population will increase dramatically. It is hard to believe that this would have actually happened, since the government's doubling of the utility costs of every single Hungarian household would mean that Fidesz will hand over power to Péter Magyar next spring, since one of the foundations of the Orbán regime's long-term stay in power has been precisely the reduction of utility costs.

It also does not seem realistic that such a high-stakes meeting would not have been thoroughly prepared, and that the Hungarian Prime Minister would not have known in advance what kind of agreement would be outlined regarding American sanctions.

But anyway,

The Fidesz government's communication switched to the"We saved the utility cuts!" mode after the Washington talks. The Hungarian Prime Minister - who is also the Fidesz leader - was put in a kind of"savior" role, trying to score points with Hungarian voters.

We'll see how sellable this will be in the election campaign, but returning to the results of the negotiations: there has still been no agreement on the reinstatement of the double taxation agreement, which would have been important to the Hungarian side.

Further strengthening of American influence in Hungary

Based on the partial agreements made public so far, it is clear that the economic cooperation between the US and Hungary will be even closer in the defense industry, the space industry, nuclear technology and energy policy, and it is not excluded that further announcements will be made in other areas. The exemption from American sanctions – however long it lasts – has a price: Hungary will buy American nuclear fuel elements, more LNG gas, and who knows what other benefits we will provide to American investors. At the same time, this may have a positive side: the Hungarian state may have to dig deeper into its pockets, but the unilateral energy dependence on Russia, which has greatly exceeded a healthy level, may be somewhat eased, and the European Union has been very much expecting the Hungarian side to get rid of Russian energy since the Russian-Ukrainian war.

If the things discussed at the Washington talks are successfully implemented even in the gray everyday life, then American economic activity and influence in Hungary will continue to grow, but politically and economically we should depend more on the USA than on Russia.

Although Trump’s power is seen by critics as authoritarian and dangerous to democracy, the US political system, despite all its troubles and confusion, is still not a dictatorship. (For example, a young Democrat who is a staunch opponent of Trump and who also calls himself a socialist was recently elected mayor of New York.) In contrast, in Russia, woe is to any opposition politician who poses a real threat to Putin’s power: he faces imprisonment or, worse, a mysterious death.

One tangible benefit of American influence is that Viktor Orbán can now negotiate with the European Commission and other European leaders against the backdrop of his friendship with Trump. Of course, this is not a panacea – Hungary will not be able to access the frozen EU funds tomorrow – but it may give the Hungarian prime minister some room to maneuver in Brussels. In any case, it is more maneuverable than when not only the European Union but also the US administration put pressure on Budapest during Biden’s presidency.

The author is a political analyst.