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Anti-Narcotics Mission So Far: 14 Venezuelans Killed, Zero Damage to Maduro

Wednesday, September 17


In the midst of growing suspense between chavismo and the Venezuelan audience, the United States says it carried out a second lethal strike against a boat coming from Venezuela. We learned about it in identical fashion to that first precision strike on Tuesday, September 2. Trump, via Truth Social, published a video of a black boat, seemingly smaller than the previous one, floating without moving in any direction until a burst of black smoke surrounds it and it appears in flames.

Trump said the attack left “three male terrorists” dead, that they were carrying drugs to the United States and were in international waters in the Caribbean. This was followed by reposts from the newly renamed Department of War and from the U.S. Southern Command. The next day, Trump told reporters around him that in fact they had attacked three boats, but there’s no video or detail whatsoever of the alleged third one.

If it’s confirmed that the victims are indeed Venezuelans (like it already happened with the mourning reported in San Juan de Unare), three elements can be drawn.

For now, the U.S. has not stepped up the level of hostilities. The strike Trump reported on Monday doesn’t surpass the previous one in terms of the threat it represents for Maduro and the drug-trafficking networks involving chavista figures.

Second, the U.S. shows no interest in detaining the alleged traffickers to reveal information about the so-called Cartel de los Soles and its logistics network. Trump continues presenting extrajudicial killings as a spectacular event meant to deter drug-trafficking operations in the Caribbean, targeting the U.S. market.

And also, Trump handles the military deployment with the same erratic, capricious discourse that ties U.S. policies to his own narrative and personal interests. Before announcing the strike on Truth Social, Trump had declared on Monday that the naval deployment was yielding results because no boats were being detected. He then compared Maduro’s 2024 electoral fraud to his own defeat against Joe Biden in 2020, which he considers fraudulent and a central element of his epic as a leader, unjustly toppled before returning to power.

However, if the status quo holds and the U.S. military threat fades away, Cabello will have gained even more power and will try to punish those who showed willingness to negotiate.

Meanwhile, U.S. moves have not translated into significant risks for chavismo despite the fluidity of events, at least for now. The naval deployment is entering its second month and, although there are no signs it’s about to end, the target continues to be civilians accused of drug trafficking. Not, for instance, military targets in Venezuelan waters. Nor figures or infrastructure on land, as certain actors and social media pundits suggest might happen.

The two dominant discourses inside chavismo have become more distinguishable in this context. On one side, Diosdado Cabello poses as the regime’s die-hard man, determined not to bend in any way before the threat of an attack he described as imminent on September 11. “We are not going to make any concessions to imperialism,” Cabello said at a PSUV rally. “That would be a historic mistake. Because when you make concessions to imperialism, it just comes for more.”

On the other side, Maduro continues trying to interact with Trump and showing interest in supporting his anti-drug initiative, while lashing out against Rubio and Kamla Persad-Bissessar, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago who said the U.S. should violently kill narcos. Before Trump posted the second strike, Maduro hinted on Monday that the U.S. could end its drug addiction epidemic by working with Venezuela, while claiming that chavismo is ready for any scenario, including armed struggle. He also praised figures who cooperate with chavismo like Zapatero, Gustavo Petro, and U.S. diplomat John McNamara, the chargé d’affaires for Colombia and Venezuela with whom Maduro says he maintains “minimal communications” for the repatriation of Venezuelan migrants.

“We face a threat of war against Venezuela, I am not dramatizing,” Maduro said on Tuesday, after the announcement of the second precision strike, at an event where he set up a supposed National Council for Sovereignty and Peace. “Venezuela is being subjected, in violation of international law and treaties, to a despicable and criminal threat.”

With this supposed structure, Maduro and Jorge Rodríguez say they are coordinating with different sectors in defense of the territory (including non-chavista representatives, businesspeople, religious figures, and others) through different working groups.

“A diplomatic group [mesa de trabajo] to show Venezuela’s truth to the world. A legal group because there are many false testimonies that have been raised,” Rodríguez said at the event. “And a political table to articulate all dialogue initiatives.”

They are joined by a chorus of pundits who amplify the Trump administration’s bellicose rhetoric—and the idea that this time it’s serious, that madurismo’s collapse is indeed coming.

As our latest Political Risk Report (titled “Diosdado Ex Machina”) points out, Cabello wields his own discourse to raise the costs for those within the ruling coalition who may be seeking to negotiate or give in before Washington. A source comments that in the case of an intervention inside Venezuela where the regime collapses and the state loses territorial control, a radical armed group would emerge seeking to sabotage the establishment of a new regime. However, if the status quo holds and the U.S. threat fades away, Cabello will have gained even more power and will try to punish those who showed willingness to negotiate.

Discourses in conflict

Outside the regime there are two dominant discourses. The most visible group we can call the criollo hawks or the halcones empedernidos. They suggest the U.S. is preparing to decisively use its military force against chavismo, and that it indeed seeks regime change even if it speaks of fighting drug trafficking and the urgency of dismantling the Cartel de los Soles. They have not questioned Washington’s actions so far, much less the evident omission regarding human rights and due process in killing 14 alleged drug traffickers. Rather, they seem to view it as part of a crescendo of military actions to come in the next days and weeks.

The main face of this group is María Corina Machado and the allies of the Comando Con Venezuela, including figures from parties like Voluntad Popular and Primero Justicia who in recent weeks have backed the U.S. actions in several statements, denouncing the Cartel de los Soles and the criminal nature of the military. This includes the likes of VP’s Yon Goicoechea and PJ president María Beatriz Martínez and the party’s vice president of Training and Education, Paola Bautista de Alemán. The latter wrote last week that perhaps, given the death of politics in Venezuela, “democracy must be restored through the legitimate and orderly use of force.” They are joined by a chorus of comunicadores and social media pundits who amplify the Trump administration’s bellicose rhetoric—and the idea that this time it’s serious, that madurismo’s collapse is indeed coming.

The second dominant discourse comprises a blend of actors that view the current U.S.-Venezuela conflict as an opportunity to open up a new negotiation process bringing together the chavista elite, Washington, and a Venezuelan counterpart. This group maintains that the cause of the problem lies in the polarized positions from the Trump government, the opposition leadership, and Miraflores, and that there must be a new dialogue route to ease the crisis of democracy and human rights. It’s a group with a presence inside Venezuela that is not under persecution, with contact with the ruling elite, but not necessarily enjoying legitimacy or a political mandate.

The Maduro regime seems to be waging a massive witch hunt within the judicial system.

This group includes designated lawmakers Henrique Capriles and Stalin González, as well as representatives from universities such as rectors Arturo Peraza S.J. (UCAB) and Víctor Rago (UCV). Peraza met with Maduro and Cilia Flores at La Casona a few days after the first anniversary of the July 28 electoral fraud, accompanied by Caracas archbishop Raúl Biord and María Eugenia Mosquera, president of television channel VALE TV. Now, in light of the tension, Peraza called on Maduro to recognize Machado’s camp as a legitimate counterpart at a negotiation table. He also said Machado is obliged to negotiate with madurismo, even though “the political process at this time doesn’t seem to allow for this kind of outcome” (the UCAB rector also criticized Cabello’s militarist stance and the loss of domestic institutions). Rago supported him by offering UCV’s campus as the venue for a “possible dialogue” between Maduro and Machado, who hasn’t left her shelter since January.

In the shadows of these public statements and operating in much more opaque realms, other actors would be pitching a negotiated way out of the conflict, which may involve Maduro’s departure from office but seek to ensure chavismo’s continuity in power. César Bátiz, director of El Pitazo, speaks of “chavista sectors and Venezuelan businesspeople” exploring this idea. Rumors on social media point more explicitly to former Interior Minister Miguel Rodríguez Torres, a former political prisoner under Maduro, to figures close to the Rodríguez siblings, and of course to Zapatero. Special envoy Richard Grenell awaits his opportunity, and last night said at the Conservative Political Action Summit that he understands what Maduro wants.

“I believe that we can still have a deal. I believe in diplomacy. I believe in avoiding war,” Grenell said at the conference in Paraguay.

What’s happening in Venezuela?

The Maduro regime seems to be waging a massive witch hunt within the judicial system, perhaps bigger than the Public Ministry purge following the sacking and exile of Luisa Ortega Díaz in 2017.

The information began spreading from former prosecutor Zair Mundaray (from the Ortega Díaz era), who reported that the regime had “discovered” an extortion scheme led by a prosecutor in Carabobo who allegedly committed suicide. Although there were no arrests initially, Mundaray later reported that the CICPC was blackmailing those involved. In the following days, he echoed his sources in Venezuela warning that the purge extended to Anzoátegui, Bolívar, Nueva Esparta and even the Supreme Tribunal, with the alleged disappearance of Bárbara Rojas, assistant to the president of the Criminal Chamber.

Official recognition came soon after, when Mundaray said the purge was aimed at the cronies  of Chief Prosecutor Tarek William Saab.

Últimas Noticias, a newspaper under chavista influence, reported on September 9 that leading prosecutors (in charge of Corruption, Organized Crime, and Common Crimes) were in SEBIN custody, along with prosecutor Farik Mora Salcedo, alleged partner of Rojas. As a close figure to Saab, Mora Salcedo has handled important cases for chavismo like the persecution of Juan Requesens, Roberto Marrero, and those accused in the 2018 drone assassination attempt against Maduro, as Runrunes reports in this profile. And on September 10, a statement signed by Saab came out, claiming that 570 Public Ministry officials are being “processed and prosecuted,” including 14 Carabobo prosecutors.

Saab’s communications are yet to mention the three senior prosecutors, Mora Salcedo, or Rojas, who have now been missing for more than a week. The Últimas Noticias piece confirmed that the prosecutor who ran the Carabobo extortion scheme was found dead in a Maracay hotel.

The typical repression of the past year continues to leave new victims. Monitoreamosreported that Maduro and Diosdado already got 13 political prisoners after releasing another 13 at the end of August (a list that included Américo de Grazia and the former mayors of Maracaibo and Cabimas). Amid the noise about the warships and the first precision strike, the regime went after a family in Carabobo including a two-year-old baby. CLIPPVE reported on September 6 that the PNB entered a home in Carabobo and abducted 17-year-old Miguel Guillén and his 72-year-old grandmother Miriam Fernández. When his sister, Chantal Guillén, went to the police station with her baby daughter, the officers decided to detain both of them as well.Miguel and the baby were released on September 8, but Chantal and her grandmother are now part of the list of political prisoners, which stands at 823 people according to Foro Penal’s latest count.

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