Andreazza: The surveillance theory is weak, but violating the ankle monitor is enough grounds for Bolsonaro's arrest.

10:28

We all read this news over the weekend.

He became the fourth former Brazilian president imprisoned in the last decade – alongside Collor, Temer, and Lula – and the tenth in the history of the Republic.

Brazil imprisons a president, current or former, every 14 years (although 6 of the 10 members on this list faced imprisonment in the context of coups, states of siege, or dictatorships).

It's undeniable that our democratic history is poor.

Only 6 Brazilian presidents elected by vote in the last 100 years completed their term:

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Eurico Gaspar Dutra

Juscelino Kubitschek

Fernando Henrique Cardoso

Lula

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Bolsonaro

But Dilma was impeached in her second term, and Lula and Bolsonaro were imprisoned after leaving the presidency. Eurico Gaspar Dutra was Getúlio Vargas's Minister of War and participated in the operation that led to the closure of Congress and the establishment of the Estado Novo dictatorship. And while it's not accurate to say that the reelection amendment was a self-coup, it wasn't a gesture of republican greatness either: FHC used the prestige of his office to change the rule for his own benefit, in a process marked by scandals.

And this is our dream team. All other Brazilian presidents elected by vote were overthrown, resigned under pressure, or had their terms interrupted.

In fact, when we look at our history, almost half of Brazilian presidents weren't even chosen by popular vote – they came to power indirectly, through military imposition or by Congress.

To make matters worse, until 1989, no Brazilian presidential election had a turnout of more than 20% of the population. It may not seem like it, but we are in the longest period of democratic normalcy ever experienced in Brazil, with record levels of popular participation in the election of our representatives – and of the seven presidents who have taken office since redemocratization, four were imprisoned and two were removed from office through impeachment proceedings.

It's a terrible record, but consistent with where we live in the world. The history of Latin America is the history of political instability.

Between 1907 and 1966, our region experienced 20 coups d'état – an average of one every three years. If we consider only the period between the second half of the 20th century and today, at least 34 coups d'état have taken place in the region.

Only Bolivia saw 13 attempted coups d'état in the 20th century. Since independence, Brazil has survived 9.

In less than a century, Argentina was marked by six military coups: in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976. Only in 1989, for the first time in more than six decades, did a civilian Argentine president hand over power to an elected successor.

While things improved with the end of the Cold War, Latin America has still seen 10 presidents removed from office by Congress since 1989.

In this context, Bolsonaro's arrest is a symptom of a much larger problem. We have a habit of electing terrible political elites, and we suffer harsh consequences because of it.

When economists measure how often a country abruptly changes its government, they realize that this takes a heavy toll on growth: if a country frequently ousts rulers, each change is associated with a 2.4% drop in GDP per capita growth.

This happens, in part, because when a country is trapped in a climate of tension – with strikes, protests, and threats of coups and impeachment – those with money become afraid of the future, and as a result, they postpone investments, cancel projects, and send money out of the country. Political chaos becomes economic chaos.

A key reason why Latin America grows so little is because you don't build refineries, railroads, or telecommunications networks by investing in a country where each new government threatens to rewrite the rules of the old government – or fall into the first political crisis.

The problem is that contracts become invalid, and reforms stall halfway through. As a result, companies produce less, innovate less, and take fewer risks.

And the impact isn't limited to the present. Some studies show that, during times of crisis, many families take their children out of school to cut costs. This reduces enrollment when the crisis begins, but it also undermines productivity long after it ends.

To make matters worse, as Turkish economist Dani Rodrik, a Harvard professor, revealed, politically polarized countries with weak institutions suffer much more when the rest of the world deteriorates. It's not smart to live in instability.

When political parties are stable, the judiciary functions properly, and the rules of the game are respected, an external shock becomes, at most, a difficult period: spending is cut, the exchange rate is adjusted, growth slows for a few years, but over time everything returns to normal.

In Latin America, where the political system is almost always on the brink of collapse, the same shock turns into a tragedy. What could be a temporary adjustment transforms into debt default, hyperinflation, and banking collapse. Any headwind becomes a storm.

Literature shows that if Latin America had the same stability as developed countries, it could have grown by about one percentage point more per year in recent decades.

It may seem like a small amount, but over decades, that's the difference between a lower-middle-class country and a middle-class country.

Imagine that the average annual income in Latin America was US$10,000 per person in 1980. If that income grows by 2% per year, after 40 years it becomes US$22,000. At 3% per year, it would reach nearly US$32,000. That's the extent of the damage that political instability causes.

In the end, this is what Bolsonaro's arrest reveals. The most popular name on the Brazilian right is behind bars. And this is just another chapter in a long history of institutional instability that spans borders, centuries, and regimes. A history that seems far from over.