In 1962, Algeria established itself within borders designed by and for France, encompassing territories historically linked to its neighbors. In the name of these historical borders, Tunis and Rabat could have hoped that this blatant territorial injustice would be rectified in the post-colonial era. This was especially true given that the pan-African rhetoric of the time extolled unity and solidarity: how could one imagine that a free Algeria—which proclaimed itself the Mecca of liberation movements—would act as a guardian of the injustices of French colonization? Yet this is precisely what happened, and very quickly. Algiers' policy, under the guise of anti-imperialist rhetoric, actually consisted of perpetuating colonial plunder for its own benefit, in contempt of the legitimate expectations of its neighbors. The revolutionary fraternity displayed in 1962 would soon crumble, giving way to mistrust and resentment.
In the early years following Algerian independence, Ahmed Ben Bella—who became Algeria's first head of state after the coup against the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA)—played a skillful game. On the one hand, he loudly proclaimed his respect for Pan-African principles, while on the other, he made numerous verbal assurances to Bourguiba and Hassan II to defuse their border disputes. These promises, often made in private or in discreet correspondence, would prove to be nothing but empty words.
Tunisia's dashed hopes: the secret Cairo agreement (1964)
Let's begin with Tunisia. Bourguiba had made the recovery of the Tunisian Saharan extension a priority as early as 1956, citing historical documents as evidence. He considered the claim legitimate, based on Ottoman titles from 1707 and Franco-Libyan agreements (1910, 1956) that placed the border at Garet El Hamel (marker 233). Yet, Bourguiba refrained from any direct confrontation with the nascent Algeria. In February 1959, he declared that he preferred to claim his Sahara today rather than open a conflict with our Algerian brothers tomorrow. He even went so far as to send a symbolic commando to plant the Tunisian flag on the famous marker 233, near Tataouine, in July 1961—a daring attempt immediately crushed by the French air force and troops from Algiers. Bourguiba's skill then consisted of waiting for his moment, convinced that the new Algerian state, indebted to Tunisian support during the war of independence, would eventually negotiate in good faith.
The opportunity seemed to present itself in January 1964, during the second OAU summit in Cairo. Behind the scenes, Bourguiba and Ben Bella met to discuss the unresolved border issue. The persuasive Tunisian president brought up the matter of border marker 233 again. And then, a miracle (no, a deception!): Ben Bella yielded to the charismatic Tunisian president. The two men sealed a secret agreement under which Algeria pledged to return the disputed 20,000 km² strip of land to Tunisia. For Tunis, this was a major diplomatic victory, secured discreetly with a handshake between the two presidents, and which was to be formally ratified in writing. The testimony of Tahar Belkhodja, then a young diplomat accompanying Bourguiba, confirms this moment of euphoria: Bourguiba submitted the issue of border demarcation to Ben Bella… The Algerian head of state verbally agreed to recognize Tunisian sovereignty, he would later recount. Tunisia believed it was on the verge of success.
Unfortunately, this secret Cairo agreement was never implemented. A few months later, the ground in Algiers trembled: in June 1965, Colonel Houari Boumediene overthrew Ben Bella in a coup. With this colonel, who had never fired a single shot against the French army and who embodied a deep-seated inferiority complex toward the true Algerian heroes who had fought for independence, Algeria plunged into a military-nationalist regime determined to cede nothing of France's legacy. The new ruler of Algiers summarily dismissed the agreement reached with Bourguiba. Barely installed in power, he adopted an inflexible line: no modification of the colonial borders would be tolerated. Thus, Ben Bella's promise was buried before it had even been formalized, betraying Bourguiba's trust. Algiers now clings to the principle of the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism, a principle enshrined as sacrosanct dogma at the OAU by Algerian diplomacy as early as 1964 (see the chronicle by historian Bernard Lugan). The tone, once cordial, becomes harsh: every time Tunis dares to mention border marker 233 again, Algiers responds with a stinging rejection. The about-face is blatant. Boumediene, on the contrary, considers any Tunisian claim a potential casus belli, an unacceptable attack on the integrity of Algerian territory. The negotiations, envisioned as state-to-state talks, turn into a closed monologue on Algiers' side. Bourguiba, stunned and then furious, witnesses the collapse of his hopes. His triumphant Algerian counterpart plays for time and leverages the balance of power.
Assurances never kept towards Morocco
The Kingdom of Morocco, for its part, would experience a similar disillusionment. Unlike Tunisia, there was no secret written agreement with Ben Bella, but rather a series of verbal and written promises that would prove equally empty. As early as 1961, King Mohammed V had received representatives of the GPRA (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic) in Rabat. An agreement was reached in July 1961—within the context of the Évian Accords—providing for the creation of a joint commission to demarcate the borders after independence. The GPRA reiterated on this occasion its promise that the disputed border would be reopened for discussion as soon as possible. Confident in these guarantees, Morocco patiently awaited 1962.
In the aftermath of Algerian independence in September 1962, King Hassan II (who succeeded the late Mohammed V, who died in February 1961) dispatched a friendship mission to Algiers to congratulate the new leaders and remind them of their promises. Alas, the ground was already beginning to shift beneath Morocco's feet. In October 1962, taking advantage of the administrative ambiguity surrounding the establishment of the new state, the Algerian army militarily occupied Tindouf, forcibly removing local representatives loyal to Morocco. Clashes ensued, resulting in civilian deaths—the first signs that Algiers had no intention of negotiating these strategic regions. Rabat nevertheless stalled, still favoring the diplomatic option.
In March 1963, Hassan II undertook a three-day official visit to Algiers to meet Ahmed Ben Bella, now Prime Minister of the Algerian government. The King hoped to resolve the issue amidst the enthusiasm of regained independence. Cooperation agreements were signed, and, most importantly, Hassan II formally raised the border issue, demanding the activation of the commission agreed upon in 1961. Ben Bella, affable, displayed no open hostility. On the contrary, he asked the King for a little patience: according to him, Algeria was still undergoing institutional transition and first needed to establish its governing bodies, a constitution, and so on. Ben Bella then assured Hassan II that a solution would be found within a few months, once Algeria had stabilized."I am simply asking for a delay, until I officially become president in September or October, and then we will address the border issue together." It goes without saying that independent Algeria could not be considered France's heir with regard to its borders, he essentially declared to the Moroccan sovereign. These words were intended to be reassuring, and Algeria claimed it did not want to repeat the border abuses of colonialism. At the time, Hassan II seemed inclined to believe him. After all, Ben Bella was a comrade in the anti-colonial struggle, welcomed to Rabat in 1962 as a hero alongside the president of the GPRA, Benyoucef Benkhedda. Morocco wanted to believe in the revolutionary sincerity of its Algerian brothers-in-arms.
Unfortunately, this latest promise from Ben Bella would never be kept. The few months' delay turned into an indefinite postponement. Instead of addressing the border issue in the fall of 1963, Ben Bella's Algeria adopted an increasingly rigid and suspicious stance toward Morocco. Algerian propaganda began accusing Morocco of expansionism, preparing the public for a possible confrontation. In September, Algiers moved troops toward the Béchar-Tindouf border, while in Morocco, the nationalist press republished maps of Greater Morocco that included the Algerian Sahara. Tensions escalated further when Moroccan intelligence intercepted Algerian interference: Ben Bella had secretly supported sending armed groups into Moroccan territory to foment unrest, while denying any aggressive intent. The climate of trust deteriorated irreparably.
In early October 1963, the situation spiraled out of control. Skirmishes broke out along the desert border. Hassan II, angered by Algiers' continued retreat, decided to respond to Algerian provocations: on October 14, 1963, the Moroccan army crossed the border to retake the posts of Hassi Beïda and Tinjoub, occupied by the Algerians. This marked the beginning of the brief but violent Sand War. Moroccan units advanced several kilometers into Algerian territory, reaching the outskirts of Tindouf, inflicting a resounding defeat on the opposing forces. Meanwhile, the renegade Ahmed Ben Bella launched a fervent appeal for popular resistance against the Moroccan aggressor, presenting the conflict as a new anti-imperialist struggle. In retaliation, Algeria expelled approximately 6,000 Moroccan civilians residing within its borders. In a tragic irony, these deadly battles could likely have been avoided if Ben Bella had honored his promise of dialogue. Instead, he allowed the situation to fester and launched an armed conflict against Morocco. Many commentators argue that this armed conflict served the Algerian regime by unifying the home front and preventing the civil war that the true Algerian resistance fighters, led by Hocine Aït Ahmed, threatened to wage against the imposters Boumediene and Ben Bella.
Boumediene actively worked to institutionalize the colonial border as inviolable. It was under his leadership that Algeria became the champion of the principle of the inviolability of colonial borders at the OAU. Adopted at the 1964 Cairo conference, this diplomatic rule—officially aimed at preventing conflicts in Africa—primarily benefited Algiers by retroactively legitimizing its territory enlarged by colonialism. This supposedly neutral principle was in reality an instrument forged to impose a colonial legacy, allowing Algeria to retain the territories taken from its neighbors. Boumediene made it his legal shield, silencing any Moroccan or Tunisian claims under the guise of international law.
Meanwhile, Algeria heavily militarized its western border, acquiring, thanks to Soviet aid, one of the most powerful arsenals in Africa. Here is what the CIA wrote at the time:
One of our main difficulties lies in the reaction of Morocco and Tunisia to Algeria’s massive military buildup, carried out with Soviet assistance. Algeria overreacted to its defeat by Moroccan forces in 1963 and now possesses the third-largest military arsenal in Africa. Soviet military aid, comprised of equal parts grants and loans, now amounts to more than $180 million. Deeply concerned by Algeria’s growing power, Hassan and Bourguiba have requested additional military assistance from us, as well as an American guarantee regarding their national security. Both seem dissatisfied with our lack of responsiveness to their requests for arms and protection. King Hassan, who arrives in Washington tomorrow for an official visit, intends to address the issue of security as an absolute priority.
The day will come when Morocco will claim its eastern Sahara— Charles Saint-Prot, French geopolitician
In the southeast, in the territories seized from Tunisia, Boumediene adopted a more subtle, but equally inflexible, tactic. He knew Tunisia was weaker militarily and economically, and therefore less threatening. He would simply drag things out until the adversary was exhausted. For a few years (1965-1967), Algiers and Tunis maintained Byzantine discussions within a joint commission. But Boumediene refused any compromise: Algeria remained entrenched at the Fort Saint line (milestone 220), definitively rejecting milestone 233, a favorite of Bourguiba.
Agreements that can fall apart from one day to the next.
Tunisia, isolated (its French ally having abandoned it on this issue, and Morocco preoccupied with its own front), found itself with its back against the wall. In April 1968, after intense pressure, Bourguiba resigned himself to diplomatic capitulation. A memorandum of understanding was signed, in which Tunis officially recognized the border demarcation as desired by Algiers, that is, stopping at marker 220. The disputed portion up to marker 233 was relinquished in writing. The final signing took place on January 6, 1970: on that day, Tunisian Minister Habib Bourguiba Jr. (the president's son) initialed the definitive delimitation treaty with Abdelaziz Bouteflika, ratifying the current Saharan border. This episode was poorly received by Tunis. The day before, on January 5th, a delegation of Tunisian officers who had gone to Algiers to discuss the border demarcation one last time were abruptly turned away… sealing Tunisia’s loss of a territory twice the size of Qatar and rich in hydrocarbons. A clear amputation in favor of Algeria, which Bourguiba, reluctant and bitter, would later describe as a gift in the name of brotherhood.
You see, Algeria has a big belly… full of gas!
— Habib Bourguiba, alluding to the riches that Tunis had taken from it
On the Moroccan side, and after years of strained relations, Hassan II also finally reached a compromise on the Eastern Sahara. In January 1969, Hassan II and Boumediene met in Ifrane and reached a compromise in principle, formalized by a Treaty of Friendship. This thaw led to the signing, in June 1972, of a Convention on the State Border between Morocco and Algeria. Under the terms of this agreement, Morocco recognized the border demarcation inherited from the colonial era, effectively relinquishing its claims to Tindouf and Colomb-Béchar. In exchange, Algiers made some economic concessions that had never been honored until then (a promise of Moroccan access to the Gara Djebilet iron ore deposits, cooperation on a trans-Saharan pipeline) and committed to definitively resolving the dispute. Rabat accepted this treaty because the context had changed: the late King Hassan II had initiated the claim to the Western Sahara, which was colonized by Spain. He thus took a step, reluctantly sacrificing Eastern Sahara to better focus on the Western Sahara issue. However, Hassan II would not have to bitterly regret his border agreement with Boumediene. Indeed, the 1972 treaty was never ratified by the Moroccan Parliament, rendering it null and void. Furthermore, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco stipulates that it intends to preserve, in its entirety and integrity, its territorial unity and consolidate its national unity.
Habib Bourguiba, until his death, never accepted the loss of border marker 233. A symbol of this resentment, he kept a large map of Tunisia prominently displayed in his office behind his chair, showing the border not at marker 220, imposed by Algeria, but extending to marker 233, encompassing the entire Tunisian Sahara. To his foreign visitors, he often pointed to the map with a touch of dark humor:"You see, Algeria has a big belly... full of gas!"—an allusion to the riches that Tunis had been deprived of. His successors, including President Ben Ali, left this map hanging in the Carthage Palace, a silent reminder of the lost territory.
Tunisian civil society, for its part, has not entirely abandoned the idea that this dispossession could one day be reconsidered. Historians, former diplomats, and Tunisian nationalists regularly bring the issue back to the forefront, speaking of the lands annexed or confiscated by Algeria and demanding justice—if only moral justice. Kaïs Saïed, the current president, is even accused of bowing entirely to Algiers' line, to the point of making Tunisia a virtual 59th wilaya (province) of Algeria. But the tide is turning in Tunis. According to authentic photographs currently circulating, Kaïs Saïed is seen timidly posing, amidst the ashes, in front of the now-famous comprehensive map of the Tunisian Sahara.
In Morocco, the question of Eastern Sahara remained a taboo subject in public discourse for a long time after 1975, as Rabat focused on recovering Western Sahara. Nevertheless, Moroccans still feel they were deceived in 1962-63. The idea that Algeria tricked Morocco by exploiting its spirit of fraternity is gaining ground. Even abroad, people are not fooled. Voices like that of Charles Saint-Prot, president of the Observatory of Geopolitical Studies in Paris, assert that the day will come when Morocco will reclaim its Eastern Sahara, bolstered by all its historical and legal claims proving Moroccan sovereignty over these territories. These territories constitute a vast area covering approximately 789,000 km². This figure represents slightly more than the current area of Morocco, including Western Sahara (approximately 710,000 km²) and corresponds to about one third of the area of Algeria (subject of my column next Sunday).
