A recent report issued by the Middle East Institute in the United States recommended working towards a comprehensive and ambitious settlement between Morocco and Algeria, including the Sahara issue and extending to address regional tensions through a phased approach, which in its first phase includes setting principles and a timetable for the settlement, while postponing the final solution to a later stage.
The same report indicated that the first phase of reconciliation “must ensure that the Polisario Front commits to halting attacks and declaring a ceasefire, and that Morocco commits to a purely defensive position, refraining from any military operations outside the current lines of control, allowing the United Nations Mission (MINURSO) to establish a mechanism for reporting incidents and preventing escalation, and amending the mission’s mandate to include monitoring the ceasefire, while providing the necessary funding and equipment.”
The document also recommended that Washington ensure, in the pre-final stages, “a clear process addressing the details of the autonomy plan, with precise timetables and phases, and the involvement of representatives of the camps, the diaspora and the population in the southern provinces, not just the Polisario, in the consultation process, with the support of the United Nations in establishing a framework for the return of refugees in parallel with the negotiations, and initiating a program for the disarmament and reintegration of Polisario fighters with American and European funding.”
The Middle East Institute pointed to “the importance of establishing a direct dialogue mechanism between Morocco and Algeria through the creation of an official channel under American supervision, initially focusing on easing hostile rhetoric, reducing public tension, and developing communication protocols, while identifying areas of technical cooperation, such as border management.”
In discussing the implementation phase of the settlement plan, the report stressed that “this phase requires moving to deeper structural changes, through security confidence-building measures, such as establishing a direct military dialogue between Morocco and Algeria to ensure transparency on the borders and prevent incidents, developing protocols for notifying military maneuvers, and establishing a multilateral mechanism (United States, European Union, Morocco, Algeria) to combat terrorism, with a development component funded by the European Union, in addition to adopting a collective approach to information exchange and regional coordination to avoid exporting migrants and reduce political pressures.”
The same source explained that “resolving this long-standing conflict over the Sahara requires an understanding that this issue is only part of a broader matter related to the deep competition for regional leadership between Morocco and Algeria, a competition rooted in the circumstances of the two countries’ post-colonial formation, which has flared up intermittently over the decades and has intensified significantly in recent years.” He continued, “Morocco and Algeria fought a short border war in 1963, sparked in part by Rabat’s attempt to regain control of territories it had lost during decades of arbitrary colonial border demarcation.” He added, “This war was short and did not change the borders of the two newly independent states, but the political systems in the two countries have evolved to reflect conflicting worldviews.”
The document added that “Morocco adopted a pro-Western, anti-communist, and pro-free trade approach, while Algeria clung to its revolutionary legacy and concepts of solidarity with the Third World. Although these positions have softened over time, their legacy continues to fuel mutual hostility,” highlighting that “the two countries compete diplomatically in Africa, the Arab world, and the European Union for commercial influence, and are also engaged in an arms race. Therefore, resolving the Sahara conflict may open the door to a broader settlement, but it alone will not end this competition.”
The report highlighted that “time is on Rabat’s side, as it achieves successive diplomatic victories that strengthen its position. Therefore, the main and perhaps only incentive that might push Morocco to negotiate with Algeria is American pressure aimed at giving the Trump administration a new victory in foreign policy,” noting that “while Morocco continues its progress, Algeria and the Polisario appear to be in an unfavorable position; Algeria’s position has remained defensive, based primarily on confronting Moroccan regional influence rather than on formulating positive strategic objectives.”
The same source stressed that “the balance of negotiations is in favor of Morocco, which is making progress on the Sahara issue within the United Nations, and on its broader interests in Europe and Africa, whether an agreement is reached or not; as for Algeria, the current trends do not serve it, so any agreement must include not only a face-saving solution on the Sahara issue, but also economic and security gains to compensate for it.”
The document concluded that “Algeria is required to invest and reform economically without sacrificing stability, and it faces a practical problem related to the Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf camps. Therefore, international support for resettlement programs, through negotiation with the Polisario, will be crucial, and Algeria can demonstrate its commitment to these people by leading this file.” It concluded: “Therefore, the combination of security, economic, and political incentives can transform Algeria from a regional spoiler into an effective negotiating partner.”
